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ABSTRACT 
Foreign nationals admitted to the United States who remain beyond their period of 
admission present an enforcement problem for U.S. immigration agencies. These “visa 
overstay” cases present a vulnerability for the homeland security enterprise. U.S. 
immigration enforcement agencies need to identify, apprehend, and remove foreign 
nationals who have overstayed their visas to address this issue. Identification of these 
subjects can be through biographical or biometric means. Current efforts to identify 
overstay violators rely mostly upon biographical data transmitted to enforcement 
agencies by third parties. Overstay violators are not normally targeted for apprehension 
and removal unless they present a threat to national security or public safety. 
Biometric exit system proponents have argued that the identification of violators 
through biometric means presents a faster, more efficient (albeit possibly expensive) 
method to determine who has overstayed their visas. These proponents also indicate that 
such a system will have an impact on the number of overstay violation cases each year. 
To date, this exit system has not been implemented at the U.S. border despite 
congressional mandates to do so. This thesis examines current visa overstay enforcement 
policies, evaluates the impacts of a biometric exit system, and makes policy 
recommendations for visa overstay enforcement efforts. 
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Every year, tens of millions of nonimmigrants visit the United States for business, 
pleasure, school, or work. The expenditures of these foreign travelers provide revenue to 
U.S. businesses and create jobs across the country. While the vast majority of 
nonimmigrant visitors lawfully depart the United States each year, not every visitor leaves 
as instructed. In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) calculated that only 
1.17 percent of foreign visitors overstayed their visas in 2015.1 This percentage increased 
to 1.47 percent in fiscal year 2016 but then decreased to 1.33 percent in 2017.2  
While these percentages seem low, even with such a high compliance rate, the sheer 
volume of visitors to the United States means that those who overstayed their visa period 
approximated 527,127 foreign visitors in 2015; 739,478 in 2016; and 701,900 in 2017.3 In 
comparison, U.S. agencies apprehended 408,870 foreign nationals trying to cross the 
southern border illegally in 2016; in 2017 that number totaled 310, 531.4 These figures 
indicate that more foreign nationals are being legally admitted to the United States and 
unlawfully remaining here than are simply entering by illegally crossing the U.S.–Mexico 
border.  
The total number of annual visa overstay cases poses a security risk to the United 
States. Terrorists have previously attempted to abuse the U.S. immigration system to carry 
out attacks against U.S. persons and interests. The 9/11 Commission commented on these 
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “Fiscal Year 2015 Entry/Exit Overstay Report” (report, 
Department of Homeland Security, January 19, 2016), 7. 
2 DHS, “Fiscal Year 2017 Entry/Exit Overstay Report” (report, Department of Homeland Security, 
August 7, 2018), iii. 
3 DHS, “Fiscal Year 2016 Entry/Exit Overstay Report” (report, Department of Homeland Security, 
April 20, 2016), iv, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Entry%20and%20Exit%20 
Overstay%20Report%2C%20Fiscal%20Year%202016.pdf; DHS, “2017 Entry/Exit Overstay Report,” iii. 
4 Andrew V. Pestano, “Illegal Border Crossings from Mexico into U.S. up 23 Percent from 2015,” 
UPI, October 18, 2016, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2016/10/18/Illegal-border-crossings-from-
Mexico-into-US-up-23-percent-from-2015/7331476791148/; Geneva Sands, “Immigration Arrests Spiked, 
Illegal Border Crossings Dropped in 2017: DHS,” ABC News, December 5, 2017, https://abcnews.go.com/ 
US/immigration-arrests-spiked-illegal-border-crossings-dropped-2017/story?id=51599510. 
xiv 
past violations, stating, “For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons.”5 
The use of visas to legally come to the United States has aided terrorist operations; on 
thirteen different occasions in the past, including 9/11, terrorists have overstayed their 
visas.6 Additionally, at least four of the 9/11 hijackers had overstayed their visas or were 
out of status when they attacked the United States.7 Since 2001, more than thirty-six visa 
overstay violators have been convicted of terrorism-related charges in the United States.8  
Congress and the 9/11 Commission have stated that a biometric exit system is 
needed to address the visa overstay issue.9 They believe that using biometric traits, such 
as fingerprints and facial recognition, to identify visitors may reduce or eliminate problems 
with current visa overstay violations. System proponents argue such a system will allow 
border agencies to identify visa violators more efficiently and reduce the number of foreign 
nationals who violate U.S. immigration laws. However, current practices do not prioritize 
most visa overstay cases for enforcement action; prior efforts to identify and apprehend 
violators have achieved limited success.10 If a newly implemented biometric exit system 
includes the flaws and fallacies of current overstay policies, such a system may not have 
the desired impact. 
An increase in nonimmigrant visitors to the United States has led to a rise in visa 
overstay cases, which has consequently led to an increase in leads reviewed for 
                                                 
5 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 1st ed., Kindle (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2004). 
6 Janice L Kephart, Immigration and Terrorism: Moving beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist 
Travel (Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2005), 5. 
7 Visa Overstays: A Gap in the Nation’s Border Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Border 
and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 115 Cong. 1 
(2017) (statement of Chairwoman Martha McSally), 2. 
8 From the 9/11 Hijackers to Amine El Khalifi: Terrorists and the Visa Overstay Problem: Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House 
of Representatives, 112 Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of Candice S. Miller, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on 
Border and Maritime Security), 4. 
9 National Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, sec. 10834. 
10 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for 
Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs, GAO-11-
411 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2011), 2.  
xv 
investigation. Visa overstay cases are currently identified through database analysis using 
biographical data received from third parties. Multiple DHS agencies are involved in the 
current effort to identify, locate, apprehend, and remove visa overstay violators. In 2005, 
agencies examined 13,000 leads and investigated 4,600; in 2012, the number of leads 
increased to 212,000, but only 2,800 were referred to agents for investigation.11 Between 
2004 and 2010, Homeland Security Investigations arrested just 20 to 27 percent of the 
overstay cases upon whom they initiated investigations.12  
Limited resources, risk prioritization, biographical data issues, and the inability to 
locate overstays have all contributed to poor enforcement results against the large number 
of overstay violators. Criminology theories suggest that, based on the small number of 
enforcement resources and low removal numbers of overstay cases, some visitors may 
weigh the unlikely chance of being caught against the potential economic and social 
rewards of staying. If risk is perceived as low, they may decide to overstay their visas. In 
other words, low enforcement levels may embolden potential violators to believe they can 
avoid apprehension.  
DHS agencies use biometric technology to identify arriving nonimmigrants. The 
department has conducted pilot programs to show that a biometric exit system can identify 
departing foreign nationals. However, to date, an exit system has not been implemented 
nationwide for a variety of reasons, including cost, infrastructure, and the evolving nature 
of technology. Proponents of a biometric exit system believe its implementation will curb 
overstay violations by automating departure records, rapidly identifying overstay cases, 
reducing data errors, and preventing imposters from departing. However, some officials 
have argued that the implementation of any system must also include aggressive 
enforcement to apprehend and remove violators; without this enforcement, the system is 
only a costly illegal immigrant tracking system.13 
                                                 
11 Implementation of an Entry/Exit System: Still Waiting After All These Years: Hearing before the 
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 113 Cong. 1 (2013), 81. 
12 GAO, Overstay Enforcement, 15. 
13 Diem Nguyen and Jena McNeil, “Biometric Exit Programs Show Need for New Strategy to Reduce 
Visa Overstays” (backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, 2010), 5. 
xvi 
The homeland security experiences of other countries can help us identify effective 
practices for potential application in the United States. Applying this data to U.S. border 
enforcement agencies provides a starting point for U.S. policy development. Some of the 
advantages of a biometric exit system are evident in the European Union and other nations. 
However, some critics, including the European Parliament, have indicated that 
enforcement is still necessary to address visa overstay cases and other immigration 
violations. 
Various policy options are available to DHS to address the visa overstay problem. 
Immigration enforcement agencies could maintain the status quo, relying on biographical 
exit–based systems with the occasional “surge” of biometric systems at some airports. DHS 
could complete the installation of a biometric-based exit system at air and seaports across 
the United States while maintaining current enforcement levels. Alternatively, DHS could 
combine these methods by installing a biometric exit system while simultaneously 
increasing enforcement against visa overstay violators. 
The research in this thesis indicates that combining a biometric exit system with 
increased enforcement would give DHS the most significant opportunity to effectively 
address the visa overstay problem. This system would combine the technological benefits 
of biometrically identifying violators with the enforcement resources needed to apprehend 
and remove them. A concerted enforcement effort to locate and remove these cases will 
not only reduce the number of violators currently in the United States but would also serve 
as a future deterrent. As such, the United States should continue the developing a biometric 
exit system while increasing interior enforcement efforts against visa overstay violators. 
Even with increased enforcement operations, policy changes, and the 
implementation of a biometric exit system, reducing visa overstay violations requires 
resources and support from all levels of DHS and the executive branch. DHS border 
enforcement agencies must send a message that the integrity of our immigration system is 
paramount and that laws will be enforced. A commitment to enforcement, in conjunction 
with technology, will demonstrate that visa overstay cases are important and need to be 
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Every year, tens of millions of nonimmigrants visit the United States for business, 
pleasure, school, work, or various other reasons. The expenditures of these foreign travelers 
provide revenue to U.S. businesses and create jobs across the country; in 2016, this 
spending amounted to over $244 billion in the tourism industry alone.1 These visitors may 
travel to the United States on a particular type of visa, or they may arrive from certain 
nations where the requirement to have a visa is waived. In either case, they are 
nonimmigrants who intend to visit for a short period and then return home. While in the 
United States, they are subject to U.S. immigration laws and must depart when instructed.  
The vast majority of nonimmigrant visitors do lawfully depart the United States 
each year under the conditions of their visa. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
estimated that close to 99 percent of the fifty-two million foreign travelers who visited the 
United States in 2017 departed legally. However, not every visitor leaves as instructed. In 
2015, DHS provided an overstay estimate to Congress, calculating that only 1.17 percent 
of foreign visitors overstayed their visas in 2015.2 For fiscal year 2016, this number 
increased to 1.47 percent but then decreased to 1.33 percent in fiscal year 2017.3 While 
these percentages seem low, even with such a high compliance rate, the sheer volume of 
visitors to the United States means that those who overstayed their visa period 
approximated 527,127 foreign visitors in 2015; 739,478 in 2016; and 701,900 in 2017.4  
Some foreign nationals also try to enter the United States at the border without 
inspection. However, they comprise a smaller amount of illegal aliens than visa overstay 
                                                 
1 “Travel, Tourism & Hospitality Industry Spotlight,” Select USA, accessed June 26, 2018, 
https://www.selectusa.gov/travel-tourism-and-hospitality-industry-united-states. 
2 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “Fiscal Year 2015 Entry/Exit Overstay Report” (report, 
Department of Homeland Security, January 19, 2016), 7. 
3 DHS, “Fiscal Year 2017 Entry/Exit Overstay Report” (report, Department of Homeland Security, 
August 7, 2018), iii. 
4 DHS, “Fiscal Year 2016 Entry/Exit Overstay Report” (report, Department of Homeland Security, 
April 20, 2016), iv, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Entry%20and%20Exit%20 
Overstay%20Report%2C%20Fiscal%20Year%202016.pdf; DHS, “2017 Entry/Exit Overstay Report,” iii. 
2 
cases. For comparison, 331,333 foreign nationals were apprehended trying to cross the U.S. 
southern border illegally in 2015; 408,870 in 2016; and in 2017 that number totaled 
310,531.5 These figures (shown in Figure 1) indicate that more foreign nationals are being 
legally admitted to the United States and unlawfully remaining here than are simply 
entering by illegally crossing the U.S.–Mexico border.  
 
Figure 1. Immigration Violations by Fiscal Year6 
  
                                                 
5 Andrew V. Pestano, “Illegal Border Crossings from Mexico into U.S. up 23 Percent from 2015,” 
UPI, October 18, 2016, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2016/10/18/Illegal-border-crossings-from-
Mexico-into-US-up-23-percent-from-2015/7331476791148; Geneva Sands, “Immigration Arrests Spiked, 
Illegal Border Crossings Dropped in 2017,” ABC News, December 5, 2017, https://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
immigration-arrests-spiked-illegal-border-crossings-dropped-2017/story?id=51599510. 
6 Adapted from DHS, “Entry/Exit Overstay Report,” 2015, 2016, 2017; Pestano, “Illegal Border 
Crossings”; Sands, “Immigration Arrests.” 













Immigration Violations by Fiscal Year
3 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The total number of annual visa overstay cases as reported by DHS poses a security 
risk to the United States of America. The number of yearly overstay cases can spread the 
attention of DHS enforcement agencies thinly across a large population of subjects.7 
Terrorists and members of transnational criminal organizations can potentially exploit this 
risk since they desire to enter and operate inside the United States. These criminal actors 
have various methods to accomplish this mission. They can attempt to sneak illegally 
across the U.S. border, or try to enter the United States legally on a visa and then remain 
here to conduct operations. In either case, an immense number of overstays can show 
terrorists that they can exploit the U.S. visa system to enter and stay inside the United 
States.8 Depending on their goals, be it profiting from smuggling, trafficking in illegal 
goods, or attempting to destroy the hallmarks of our nation, these actors may or may not 
choose to violate the terms of their visas.  
Terrorists have previously attempted to abuse the U.S. immigration system to carry 
out attacks against U.S. persons and interests. The 9/11 Commission commented on these 
past violations, stating that “For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons.”9 
The use of visas to legally come to the United States has aided terrorists in their operations; 
on thirteen different occasions in the past, including 9/11, terrorists have overstayed their 
visas.10 Recent efforts by terrorists to violate immigration law can be traced back to at least 
the first World Trade Center bombing, where one of the convicted perpetrators had been 
working in the United States illegally after remaining past the period of admission for his 
                                                 
7 K. Jack Riley, Border Security and the Terrorist Threat (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 10, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT266.html. 
8 Riley, 10. 
9 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 1st ed., Kindle (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2004). 
10 Janice L Kephart, Immigration and Terrorism: Moving beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist 
Travel (Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2005), 5. 
4 
tourist visa.11 Additionally, at least four of the 9/11 hijackers had overstayed their visas or 
were out of status when they attacked the United States.12 Since 2001, more than thirty-
six visa overstay violators have been convicted of terrorism-related charges in the United 
States.13  
Dating back to the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (IIRIRA), Congress, and later, the 9/11 Commission, stated that a biometric entry/exit 
screening system is needed at the U.S. border to address the visa overstay issue.14 Using 
biometric traits, such as fingerprints, to identify visitors may reduce or eliminate problems 
with current visa overstay violations. Biometrics can verify a subjects’ identity, track their 
encounters with law enforcement, and record their entry and subsequent exit from the 
United States. These capabilities could help border agencies to identify individuals who 
have overstayed their visas and take the appropriate enforcement action.  
Congress has passed several laws regarding the implementation of an automated 
system, but to date DHS has not implemented such technology nationwide.15 However, 
DHS and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have started testing biometric exit system 
technology at several U.S. airports. Proponents of such a system argue it will allow border 
enforcement agencies to identify visa violators more efficiently and reduce the number of 
foreign nationals who violate U.S. immigration law by overstaying their visas. However, 
current practices do not prioritize most visa overstay cases for enforcement action; prior 
                                                 
11 Overstaying Their Welcome: Security Risks Posed by Visa Overstays: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives, 114 Cong. 2 (2016) (testimony of Martha McSally, Chairman, Subcommittee on Border 
and Maritime Security), 4. 
12 Visa Overstays: A Gap in the Nation’s Border Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 115 
Cong. 1 (2017) (statement of Chairwoman Martha McSally), 2. 
13 From the 9/11 Hijackers to Amine El Khalifi: Terrorists and the Visa Overstay Problem: Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House 
of Representatives, 112 Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of Candice S. Miller, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on 
Border and Maritime Security), 4. 
14 National Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, sec. 10834. 
15 Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996, H. Res. 2202, 104th Cong. (1996); 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004). 
5 
efforts to identify and apprehend violators have achieved limited success.16 If the 
implementation of a biometric exit system includes the flaws of current overstay 
enforcement policies, it may not have the impact desired by its proponents. 
This thesis hypothesizes that a biometric exit system will have minimal impact on 
the number of visa overstay cases; technology alone will not solve the current overstay 
problem. A terrorist or criminal’s primary goal in coming to the United States is to obtain 
entry into the country; if lawful entry is achieved using a visa, it is unlikely that the criminal 
would leave until his or her objective is complete.17 The presence of a biometric exit-
tracking system would do little to discourage overstay violations because the subject came 
never intending to leave; once admitted, he or she is unlikely to depart no matter what exit 
system may be in place as a deterrent.18  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
When assessing measures that the United States and DHS can take to ensure that 
visa laws are enforced, how effectively will a biometric exit system address the problem 
of visa overstay violators? What measures can be taken to enforce visa laws? 
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To examine the impacts of visa overstays on homeland security and assess current 
policies related to this issue, research for this thesis focuses on primary sources where 
available but also uses government studies and reports, congressional testimony, case law, 
statutes, news reports, and think tank studies. It also focuses on the implementation of a 
biometric exit system, its goals, and possible effects on visa overstays. Scientific studies, 
journal articles, and other scholarly works provide an exploration of biometrics and their 
use in border security. Also, this thesis looks at overstay enforcement and biometric exit 
                                                 
16 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for 
Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs, GAO-11-
411 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2011), 2.  
17 Visa Overstays: Can They Be Eliminated? Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, 
House of Representatives, 111 Cong. 2 (2010) (testimony of Edward Alden, senior fellow, Council on 
Foreign Relations), 25. 
18 Alden, 25. 
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system implementation in comparable nations to identify viable policy options that may be 
transferable to the United States.  
Ultimately, a synthesis of the previous data led to an analysis of current overstay 
enforcement efforts. This analysis helped generate policy recommendations to agency 
leaders for consideration as they search for resolutions to the security issue of visa 
overstays. A biometric exit system may enhance the ability to identify visa violators when 
compared to current methods. DHS could continue current enforcement actions against 
overstay violators; combining a biometric exit system with increased enforcement would 
allow DHS to identify, apprehend, and remove visa violators.   
This thesis only reviews foreign nationals legally admitted to the United States who 
did not depart under their visa conditions; it does not describe efforts related to violators 
entering the United States without inspection. Also, the Donald J. Trump administration 
has recently proposed making nonimmigrant visa overstay violations a federal criminal 
misdemeanor. Such a legal change may have an impact on the number of overstay 
violators; however, it is difficult to assess these implications without a bill for analysis. 
Therefore, research for this thesis focuses primarily on current policies, laws, and statutes.  
D. OVERVIEW 
This thesis constructs and analyzes alternative policy options to identify a 
successful outcome to address the homeland security gap posed by visa overstays. 
Chapter II provides background information on visa laws and processes as well as a review 
of the current literature on this topic. Chapter III discusses biometric methods and related 
exit systems, while Chapter IV analyzes similar enforcement efforts in comparable nations. 
Chapter V examines policy options regarding visa overstays by describing and assessing 
current agency policies related to violator identification and overstay enforcement. Finally, 
Chapter VI offers some alternative solutions to visa overstay enforcement to provide 
decision makers with insight into this matter.  
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter defines what constitutes a visa overstay and provides background for 
current visa laws and processes. It provides information on why visitors may overstay their 
legal term of admission to the United States and discusses current enforcement policies and 
procedures. The use of biographical and biometric enforcement systems is also reviewed. 
Each section reviews the literature surrounding each of these issues, including academic 
works, government reports, think tank papers, and congressional testimony.  
A. CURRENT VISA LAWS 
When a foreign national wants to visit the United States, in most cases he or she 
must first obtain a visa to do so. This process allows U.S. consular officials overseas to 
review the applicant’s case, conduct background checks, and determine if the subject is 
eligible for the visa applied for or if he or she poses a threat to national security. If 
applicants meet these (and other) requirements, they will receive a nonimmigrant visa to 
enter the United States.19  
In reality, obtaining a nonimmigrant visa merely allows the visitor to come to the 
United States and apply for admission at a port of entry. Upon application for admission, a 
CBP officer reviews the subject’s visa, documents, and biometrics, along with databases, 
to verify the person is admissible to the United States under the visa currently in his or her 
possession. During the arrival inspection process, CBP grants the visitor an authorized 
period of admission, either for a specific length of time or for as long as the visitor 
maintains a particular status.20 The type of visa determines the length of the entry period 
granted by CBP. The actual visa the subject receives may be valid for entry to the United 
States multiple times. What does expire, however, is the visa’s period of admission.  
                                                 
19 “Visitor Visa,” U.S. Department of State, accessed June 16, 2018, https://travel.state.gov/content/ 
travel/en/us-visas/tourism-visit/visitor.html. 
20 GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions Needed to Assess DHS’s Data and Improve 
Planning for a Biometric Air Exit Program, GAO-13-683 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability 
Office, 2013), 6, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/656316.pdf. 
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Depending on the type of visa a nonimmigrant visitor arrives with, he or she may 
be granted a period of admission for anywhere from ninety days to two years. Unlike in 
some nations (for example, the United Kingdom), U.S. law allows visitors the possibility 
of remaining inside the country past their required departure date; visitors with certain visas 
can apply with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to extend their 
stay while inside the country.21 Likewise, visitors who enter on one type of visa can apply 
to adjust their status to a different kind while they are in the United States.22 Specific 
requirements for these changes must be met but, if approved, the visitor does not always 
need to leave the United States before they occur.  
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) establishes penalties for nonimmigrant 
visitors who overstay the period of admission allowed by their visa. Exceeding this period 
means the subject is in violation of U.S. immigration law and therefore possess “unlawful 
presence”; this unlawful presence has a bearing on the person’s admissibility to re-enter 
the United States in the future, among other things.23 The act of overstaying a visa also 
results in the termination of the validity of the visa. Depending on how long the visitor 
remains past his or her admission period, the statute states that he or she will be 
inadmissible for future entry to the United States for a period of three or ten years. If DHS 
apprehends an overstay violator after their admission period expires, the violator is entitled 
to a hearing before an immigration judge.  
Visitors who come to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) are 
not required to obtain a visa but can only visit for ninety days. Remaining past this period 
means these subjects receive the same penalties of inadmissibility; they are also unable to 
participate in VWP again and must obtain a visa to visit the United States in the future.24 
If Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or another enforcement agency encounters 
                                                 
21 “Extend Your Stay,” USCIS, accessed June 16, 2018, https://www.uscis.gov/visit-united-
states/extend-your-stay. 
22 “If You Are Thinking about Changing Your Nonimmigrant Status,” U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, accessed June 16, 2018, https://www.uscis.gov/visit-united-states/change-my-
nonimmigrant-status-category/change-my-nonimmigrant-status. 
23 Inadmissible Aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(I). 
24 GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms, 9. 
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a VWP visitor within the United States after his or her period of admission has expired, 
and the visitor has not received an extension from USCIS, he or she is subject to removal 
from the United States. Based on the conditions of the VWP program, participants are not 
normally afforded a hearing before an immigration judge. Instead, the lead immigration 
official in their jurisdiction decides their case. However, VWP participants are permitted 
to seek asylum in the United States, or they may be able to find other forms of immigration 
relief in the United States.25  
B. DEFINING VISA OVERSTAY 
Visitors who remain in the United States past their period of admission are typically 
referred to as “visa overstays.” The term “visa overstay” is technically a misnomer. This 
term refers to a nonimmigrant visitor legally admitted to the United States for a specified 
period who has then remained in the country after the period has expired (or has failed to 
maintain a certain status).26 This term is still applicable even for subjects who may enter 
under the VWP because they still receive a finite period of admission. It also applies to 
subjects who may still have a valid visa in their passport; even if the visa is still valid, 
remaining in the United States past their period of admission is considered an overstay. 
Some visitors, such as students, are given a visa that is good for the “duration of their 
status” in the United States. However, if they fail to maintain that status—for example, if 
they drop out of school or change the circumstances of the visa on which they entered—
they are generally identified as a visa overstay case as well. The general term “overstay” 
may be more accurate in this regard, but following the 9/11 Commission Report’s use of 
the term and continued political debates over illegal immigration, the phrase remains 
commonplace in our vernacular. For this thesis, “visa overstay” and “overstay” are used 
interchangeably and describe the circumstances outlined above, to wit, someone admitted 
to the United States legally who remains here in violation of immigration law.  
                                                 
25 Visa Waiver Program for Certain Visitors, 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)(2). 
26 GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions, 6. 
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Visa overstays can be broken down into two categories, in-country and out-of-
country. An in-country overstay is a nonimmigrant visitor who has remained in the United 
States past the statutory period of admission. An out-of-country visitor is one who has 
departed the United States, but did so after his or her valid admission period ended.27 These 
distinctions seem unusual but are utilized in government reports regarding the overstay rate 
for some nations and to identify how many violators are currently in the United States.28  
Annually identifying how many visitors violate U.S. visa law by staying inside the 
United States has proven to be difficult. Federal law mandates that DHS (and its 
predecessor agencies) provide an estimate of these overstay cases to Congress every year. 
However, due to a lack of confidence in the data or any reliable way to definitively identify 
or track overstay cases, this reporting did not occur regularly from 1994 to 2015.29 Even 
determining if a subject has overstayed his or her visa can be problematic based on current 
data collection, let alone locating or apprehending the subject. For those who do overstay, 
immigration enforcement agencies often have little to no idea where these visitors go, or 
what their future intentions are.  
C. REASONS VISITORS OVERSTAY THEIR VISAS 
There are several reasons why foreign visitors may overstay their authorized period 
of admission. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that economic factors 
and opportunities motivate most visitors who overstay their visas to remain in the United 
States.30 Changes within a visitor’s country, while they are visiting the United States, could 
also cause the visitor to stay here past his or her admission date. For example, a coup or 
change in the government may make it difficult or impossible for the visitor to return home. 
Instead of crossing the U.S. border illegally, some visitors have used visas as a legal way 
                                                 
27 GAO, 6. 
28 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–53 (2007), 
sec. 711. 
29 GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions, 24. 
30 GAO, 1. 
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to enter the United States—and never leave—to escape violence, political turmoil, or 
economic strife in their home nation.31   
Some critics argue that our current ineffective immigration system is one cause for 
visitors to overstay their visas. In testimony before Congress, law professor and attorney 
Margaret Stock testified that the vast majority of people who overstay their visas are not 
terrorists; they are merely remaining here hoping that their application to adjust status is 
approved.32 She further stated that these subjects are afraid to leave the United States for 
fear of not being able to return in the future, and they choose to remain rather than risk 
leaving.  
This argument regarding visa violators seems a bit specious, however. Current law 
does allow visitors to apply to extend their stay and/or adjust their status while in the United 
States. However, it does not allow those applicants to remain inside our nation just because 
their application is pending. They must still abide by the terms of their visa, to wit the 
period of admission and must depart if their adjustment or extension is not approved before 
their period expires. Convenience is no excuse for breaking the law; the current 
immigration system, policies, and procedures should not be blamed for the conscious 
decisions of those who choose to violate the law. The current system includes penalties 
such as travel bars for overstay violators as a means to enforce the law and deter violators 
from breaking it.   
Criminology theories may also reveal why someone might overstay a visa in 
violation of the law. The deterrence theory proposes that an individual’s fear of being 
caught and prosecuted and the fear of jail will dissuade him or her from committing a 
crime; this results in criminal activity being deterred.33 The rational choice theory of 
                                                 
31 Aline Barros, “After Overstaying Visas, Immigrants Face Uncertain Future,” VOA, May 24, 2017, 
https://www.voanews.com/a/after-overstaying-visas-immigrants-face-uncertain-future/3868473.html. 
32 Visa Overstays: Can We Bar the Terrorist Door? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and investigations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 109 Cong. 2 
(2006) (testimony of Margaret Stock, Associate Professor, Department of Law, United States Military 
Academy), 24. 
33 Ronald L. Akers, “Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in Criminology: The 
Path Not Taken,” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 81, no. 3 (1990): 654, https://doi.org/ 
10.2307/1143850. 
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criminology assumes that a sensible subject will act to avoid costs and that, by committing 
a criminal act, the person will weigh the rewards of action with the potential costs.34 Based 
on the small number of resources dedicated by DHS and the low removal numbers of 
overstay cases (or the perception thereof), some visitors may weigh the unlikely chance of 
being caught against the potential economic and social rewards gained by staying. If the 
risk is perceived as low, they may decide to overstay their visa.  
Other possible causes for visa overstay violation are U.S. enforcement policies and 
procedures relating to immigration law in general and visa overstay cases in particular. ICE 
is the agency responsible for identifying, locating, apprehending, and removing 
immigration violators. Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) and Homeland 
Security Investigations (HSI) are the two divisions of ICE that carry out this mission. Prior 
GAO reports indicate that in the recent past, ICE dedicated only about 3 percent of its 
resources to dealing with visa overstay cases.35 The Trump administration has been 
reallocating funds for ICE’s enforcement efforts from other agencies, but these monies 
have been earmarked for detention space and removal operations, not overstay enforcement 
specifically.36 Between 2004 and 2010, HSI only arrested 20 to 27 percent of the overstay 
cases upon whom they initiated investigations.37 All of these statistics indicate that 
overstay enforcement in itself is currently not a high priority for DHS immigration 
enforcement agencies.  
As a result, a lack of DHS enforcement against overstay cases could fail to deter 
some visitors from complying with the law, thus leading to an increase in visa overstay 
violations. Between 2004 and 2010, the ICE Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation 
Unit (CTCEU) reported that it had closed 34,700 overstay cases, which resulted in 8,100 
                                                 
34 Rachael Steele, “How Offenders Make Decisions: Evidence of Rationality,” British Journal of 
Community Justice 13, no. 3 (2016): 8. 
35 Jessica M. Vaughan, “DHS Reports Huge Number of Visitors Overstayed in 2015,” Center for 
Immigration Studies, January 20, 2016, https://cis.org/Vaughan/DHS-Reports-Huge-Number-Visitors-
Overstayed-2015. 
36 Tal Kopan, “It’s Not Just FEMA: ICE Quietly Got an Extra $200 Million,” CNN, September 12, 
2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/12/politics/ice-more-money-fema-dhs/index.html. 
37 GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms, 15. 
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arrests by HSI; this is relative to the estimated overstay population of 5.5 million people 
during that time.38 That is an arrest rate of only 0.0014 percent. During fiscal year 2015, 
DHS reported that 527,127 nonimmigrant visitors overstayed their visa admission in that 
year alone. Further review by DHS analysis units indicated the suspected number of in-
country overstays that year (those still in the United States) was 482,781 subjects.39 HSI 
arrested 1,900 violators based on leads from the CTCEU. Based on these figures, through 
fiscal year 2015, generally speaking, a nonimmigrant visitor who overstayed his or her visa 
may have expected only a 0.0039 percent chance of being arrested by HSI following an 
investigation.  
While these recent figures represent an increase over prior arrest rates for overstay 
cases, the likelihood of a DHS enforcement agency detaining an overstay violator is still 
very low. The actual number of overstay arrests each year may be slightly higher because 
ERO could also have encountered overstay cases and apprehended them. However, those 
arrest numbers are not reported to DHS headquarters using the same method.40 As a result, 
identifying the total number of overstay arrests is difficult, much like determining the total 
number of overstays.  
D. DHS AGENCY OVERSTAY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
Multiple DHS agencies are involved in the current effort to identify, locate, 
apprehend, and remove visa overstay violators. CBP captures and stores biometric entry 
and biographic exit data from arriving foreign visitors and passenger manifests. The 
CTCEU is the primary division responsible for using this information to identify visa 
overstay case leads and referring this intelligence to HSI for further inquiry.41 HSI reviews 
these cases for threats to national security, public safety, or other high-risk indicators and 
assigns relevant cases for investigation. 
                                                 
38 GAO, 12. 
39 DHS, “2015 Entry/Exit Overstay Report,” 7. 
40 GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms, 15. 
41 GAO, 14. 
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Current overstay enforcement procedures generally begin with HSI’s Overstay 
Analysis Unit (OAU), which reviews departing manifests through the Automated 
Passenger Information System.42 The OAU evaluates this data and manually compares it 
to the data in electronic DHS systems, including the Arrival and Departure Information 
System (ADIS), to identify possible overstay cases. The analysis of this information by the 
OAU can serve as intelligence for target location and apprehension, although it may not 
provide a full threat analysis of the subject. The OAU may also conduct other checks to 
ensure that suspected violators have not legally adjusted their immigration status or 
received a visa extension.43  
Once the OAU has identified possible overstay cases, it refers the data to CTCEU 
for possible investigation. The CTCEU then prioritizes these leads for research based on 
threat analysis of potential risk to national security or public safety.44 An increase in 
nonimmigrant visitors to the United States has led to a rise in visa overstay cases, which 
has consequently led to an increase in leads reviewed by CTCEU for investigation. In 2005, 
CTCEU examined 13,000 leads and investigated 4,600; in 2012, this number increased to 
212,000, but only 2,800 were referred to agents for investigation.45 ICE’s Assistant 
Director for National Security Investigations testified to Congress that in fiscal year 2015, 
ICE spent approximately 650,000 man hours investigating 971,000 visa overstay case 
leads.46 Of those leads, 10,000 were determined to meet HSI priority for security or safety 
concerns.47  
                                                 
42 GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions, 2. 
43 GAO, 10. 
44 GAO, 10. 
45 Implementation of an Entry/Exit System: Still Waiting After All These Years: Hearing before the 
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 113 Cong. 1 (2013), 81. 
46 Overstaying Their Welcome: Security Risks Posed by Visa Overstays: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives, 114 Cong. 2 (2016) (testimony of Craig Healey, Assistant Director for National Security, 
ICE), 18. 
47 Healey, 19. 
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The CTCEU sends visa overstay leads that do not meet HSI criteria to ERO for 
possible action.48 HSI and ERO may also encounter overstay cases during normal 
operations, but this happens infrequently and is usually not the result of targeted 
enforcement operations. If a local or state law enforcement agency arrests a visa overstay 
violator, a scan of the violator’s fingerprints may notify ERO of his or her apprehension. 
By interfacing with these agencies through the Criminal Alien Program or the Secure 
Communities program, ERO may arrest the violator and take the appropriate enforcement 
action.  
E. CURRENT VISA OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The Trump administration has indicated that no class of immigration violator will 
be exempt from enforcement. However, previous administrations did not prioritize visa 
overstay cases for apprehension or custody if they did not have any other convictions, 
despite their violation of immigration law. For example, Amine el-Khalifi is a Moroccan 
citizen who entered the United States on a tourist visa in 1999 and never left; in 2012 the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested him after he planned a suicide attack on the 
U.S. Capitol.49 Despite overstaying his visa for thirteen years, el-Khalifi was not a priority 
to any border enforcement agency at the time the FBI arrested him.50 Even if immigration 
agencies had encountered him before he planned his attack, prior administrations would 
likely have not prioritized him for apprehension and removal because he had not committed 
any other crimes.  
Several other factors can hamper overstay enforcement investigations. DHS 
immigration enforcement agencies have a finite number of resources available and 
competing priorities can pose a challenge to these efforts.51 Having limited resources 
means DHS agencies must prioritize cases. HSI prioritizes its resources on national security 
                                                 
48 DHS, “2015 Entry/Exit Overstay Report,” 6. 
49 Miller, From the 9/11 Hijackers to Amine el-Khalifi, 4. 
50 Miller, 4. 
51 GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions, 34. 
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and public safety threats, sending other cases to ERO. Consequently, overstay cases that 
are deemed “low risk” receive fewer resources than other higher-priority cases.52 Because 
many visa violators have only broken immigration laws and have not been arrested or 
convicted of any other crime, they generally receive low priority due to ERO’s current 
staffing, funding, and detention resources.  
As a result, many overstay cases are not priorities to either agency. Former ICE 
Assistant Secretary Julie Myers Wood testified that “overstays are no one’s priorities, and 
when they are no one’s priorities, they become everyone’s problem because they 
undermine the integrity of our overall immigration system.”53 As recently as 2017, the 
GAO reported that DHS has still not altered current enforcement priorities or actions to 
address potential overstays.54  
The inability to locate overstay subjects also affects visa overstay enforcement; this 
can be one of the most challenging tasks for enforcement agencies.55 When foreign 
travelers apply for a visa (or permission to enter under the VWP), they must provide an 
address of their location in the United States. They must also provide information about 
their trip on their customs declaration upon arrival. However, there is no way to verify that 
the subject will reside at that address, or for how long, or if the address is even the subject’s 
true destination. After visitors are admitted into the United States, there is virtually no way 
to know where they are or where they are going. If they provided false information on their 
customs declaration, it will be difficult for enforcement agencies to locate them.  
Data quality issues can also affect DHS’s ability to conduct enforcement against 
visa overstay cases. Manifest inaccuracies, name errors, incomplete exit records, or failure 
to confirm a traveler’s identity could result in departure verification issues or possibly 
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allow an imposter to depart in someone else’s place.56 These issues also make it more 
difficult for the CTCEU to identify visa overstay cases or determine if they have eventually 
departed. A delay in the input of departure data means that agents may have to re-check 
old cases to see if they have later departed. This process is tedious and time-consuming 
and has an impact on CTCEU’s ability to quickly and accurately identify overstay cases 
for investigation.57  
Finally, not all law enforcement agencies fingerprint every person they arrest, 
which would affect notifications to ICE if a suspected overstay case is arrested by a local 
agency. There has also been an increase in the number of “sanctuary cities” that do not 
cooperate or notify ICE after the arrest of a foreign national. This could cause the release 
of a visa overstay violator by a local agency after his or her arrest for a criminal charge. In 
these instances, ICE would be unable to apprehend a visa overstay violator for removal.   
F. BIOGRAPHICAL ENTRY/EXIT SYSTEMS 
Commercial carriers are required to provide DHS with manifests for all passengers 
and crew arriving and departing the United States.58 In the past, as visually depicted in 
Figure 2, arriving passengers would receive a paper Form I-94 to identify themselves upon 
admission into the United States. CBP would keep the arrival half upon entry and 
contractors would later manually enter this data into computers.59 Upon exiting the United 
States, carriers were required to collect the departure half for submission to CBP for 
database entry. Joining the two parts of the I-94 would close the visitor’s record as having 
departed the United States. If no departure record was received, the visitor could be 
considered an in-country overstay. If the date on the departure I-94 was after the period of 
admission had expired, the visitor was considered an out-of-country overstay. 
                                                 
56 Implementation of an Entry/Exit System, 26. 
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Figure 2. I-94 Process for Nonimmigrant Entry and Exit from the 
United States60 
The use of paper I-94s was fraught with problems: visitors or officials could lose 
the forms, resulting in a lack of departure record; illegible documents could cause the 
names on the two halves to be entered differently; the traveler’s name on the I-94 may not 
precisely match the name on the carrier’s manifest or could be misspelled; and there could 
be a significant delay in the time the data was entered by contractors. As a result, using 
paper I-94s was not a reliable method to track overstays within the United States. This is 
the main reason why DHS and its predecessor agencies found it difficult to provide a yearly 
overstay estimate, despite congressional mandates.61 As a result, electronic documents 
have now replaced paper I-94s. 
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ICE, CBP, and USCIS also face challenges regarding the biographic nature of paper 
Alien Registration files (A-files). Current paper files track alien cases, benefits, and 
removal orders; these files are not all linked to a biometric identifier. One person could 
apply for benefits under various names and have several records.62 This is especially 
important when considering a visa overstay case; foreign visitors could overstay their visa 
and then apply for an immigration benefit using a false name. Without biometric 
verification, immigration agencies would not know the visitor is a violator and would not 
be able to take any enforcement action. Utilizing biometric identifiers will help reduce 
these types of cases because subjects cannot file multiple applications with false names; 
their biometrics will give them away. 
DHS agencies still rely heavily on biographical data manifests received from 
commercial carriers to compile lists of who has exited the country. While the electronic 
data given to DHS by commercial airlines show improvement over prior paper-based 
systems, there is still a margin for error or the possibility that bad data may affect the 
homeland security mission. Congress, the 9/11 Commission, and other groups indicate that 
biographical inaccuracies are one reason why a biometric exit system is needed. To 
understand the concepts and the possible utility of such a system, a review and analysis of 
its capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses is required.  
G. BIOMETRIC CAPTURE METHODOLOGY  
A review of the relevant works regarding biometric identification systems shows 
the science of biometrics to be accepted and mostly uncontroversial. However, there is 
debate regarding the methodology used to obtain biometrics, and there are issues regarding 
the implementation of a biometric identification system. This section examines that 
discussion and looks into the discourse surrounding biometric capture methodology as well 
as the arguments surrounding the lack of a current biometric exit system.    
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The science of biometrics has been thoroughly studied, and many works in the field 
agree that biometric traits can be utilized to identify a subject physiologically.63 The central 
discourse in this subtopic surrounds the best methodology to adequately capture and use 
biometric data. In their book, Arun Ross, Karthik Nandakumar, and Anil Jain distinguish 
between unimodal and multimodal technology systems.64 Unimodal capture systems rely 
on only one biometric trait, such as fingerprints, to identify someone, whereas a multimodal 
system combines characteristics such as fingerprints and an iris scan.65 DHS agencies and 
most U.S. law enforcement organizations currently rely on fingerprints as the primary 
method for biometric identification. Some advocates believe that prints are the best capture 
method because they are most prevalent in current databases.66 In June 2016, then-Senator 
Jeff Sessions seemed to echo this sentiment: “We should use fingerprints … that’s what’s 
in law enforcement databases. Why create a new system?”67  
Other researchers recognize that fingerprints may not always be available to 
identify a suspect. Blood or DNA evidence may be the only biometric identifiers available 
to law enforcement. In this case, DNA testing would be the most effective unimodal 
capture method.68 In other cases, using facial recognition may be the preferred single 
biometric identification method. In their case study, Joshua Klontz and Jain used off-the-
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shelf facial recognition technology to identify the Boston Marathon bombers after the fact, 
using a variety of pictures of the suspects, because no other identifiers were available.69      
However, Shoshana Magnet cautions that unimodal systems are not foolproof; the 
human body is not easily identified with biometrics because bodies are individual and 
change over time.70 Magnet advises that any bodily deviance—including worn 
fingerprints, non-normative fingers, skin diseases affecting fingerprints, or cataracts 
impacting scans of the eye—might cause biometric identification failures. Furthermore, 
people with handicaps or disabilities may be unable to access the technology itself.71  
Facial recognition scanners sometimes have difficulty identifying the elderly and 
people of color or distinguishing between genders. Factors including aging, the 
environment, and lighting may have an impact on some capabilities of facial recognition. 
In their article on this subject, Rama Chellappa, Pawan Sinha, and Jonathon Phillips 
acknowledge that in certain conditions these variables may affect a biometric system’s 
ability to identify a traveler using only his or her face.72 Harrison Rudolph, Laura Moya, 
and Alvaro Bedoya’s review of airport facial recognition technology criticizes DHS for 
possibly “deploying a system that will exhibit race or sex-biased decisions.”73 They 
comment that DHS has even admitted it is “unable to determine” if the accuracy of its 
facial scans varies based on a traveler’s demographics. Their review notes that DHS has 
had to ask its own Privacy Committee to investigate claims that its face-scanning system 
is biased.  
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Environmental factors, physiological issues, singular capture systems, or a lack of 
biometric evidence indicate that relying on one form of biometric identification may not 
be accurate enough. Ross, Nandakumar, and Jain state it is becoming evident that using a 
single biometric trait is not adequate to meet current biometric matching standards.74 They 
argue that the new idea of multimodal systems is more advantageous for improving identity 
matching and reducing errors.75 Such a system would capture multiple types of biometric 
data—such as fingerprints with an iris scan—from each subject, which would likely reduce 
the chance of having an enrollment or identification failure based on an issue or disability 
described by Magnet. DHS agencies have recognized that multimodal identification 
systems may be more advantageous for enforcement operations. The Transportation and 
Security Administration (TSA) has stated that it is incorporating an iris scan into its 
systems instead of relying solely on fingerprints because “gender, ethnicity, and age affect 
the qualities of fingerprints.”76 CBP has also cautioned that one biometric system will not 
work at every port of entry; as a result, the agency will need to use multiple biometric 
capture technologies.77    
Chellappa, Sinha, and Phillips comment that the new concept of multimodal 
biometric systems may alleviate biometric enrollment or matching issues.78 Advocacy 
groups such as the International Biometrics Identity Association have also argued in favor 
of a multimodal capture system that relies on more than one technology to capture 
biometrics.79 Ravi Das maintains that a multimodal system “can capture the unique 
characteristics of a much larger and varied target population,” thereby overcoming these 
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difficulties.80 Magnet acknowledges that multimodal biometric systems can identify more 
“othered bodies,” or people with disabilities or other non-normative issues, than unimodal 
systems.81 Overall, the extensive nature of the research, studies, tests, and algorithms 
across biometric science literature seems to validate the use of biometrics as a valid, 
feasible way to identify individuals in a border security environment.   
H. BIOMETRIC EXIT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
The United States has passed laws mandating the use of an automated biometric 
exit system at the U.S. border.82 A review of the literature shows there is disagreement 
surrounding the reasons why the government has not been able to implement an acceptable 
system successfully.83 Congressional hearings, testimonies, and reports have discussed the 
causes of implementation delays.84   
Some authors and government officials implicate the current infrastructure at U.S. 
border stations and ports as the primary impediment to installing a functional biometric 
exit system. For example, in his testimony to Congress, CBP Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner John Wagner stated that physical infrastructure poses limitations on 
implementing a biometric exit system.85 A 2016 DHS report to Congress reiterated these 
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limitations.86 The report confirms there are “major physical, logistical, and operational 
obstacles to collecting … biometric data upon departure.”87   
In a report titled Border Metrics, Marc Rosenblum and Faye Hipsman state that a 
biometric exit system may not even be required; first, border agencies need better data to 
determine a reliable approach to securing the border.88 They argue that if the goal of an 
entry/exit system is to identify visa overstays, current biographic methods are accurate 
enough.89 While their report admits a biometric exit system may prevent imposters from 
departing the United States, they suggest that identification of criminals or terrorists should 
occur upon entry into the United States. For example, CBP agents using a newly installed 
facial recognition scanner in Dulles, Virginia, recently apprehended an imposter trying to 
enter the United States.90 When the traveler’s facial scan did not match the image stored 
in his passport, it was discovered he was attempting to use a fraudulent passport to enter 
the United States. This illustrates one benefit of having a robust biometric system to 
identify foreign visitors trying to enter the United States.    
Rudolph, Moy, and Bedoya also state that no rationale has been provided for a 
biometric exit system.91 They comment that even DHS has questioned what value 
biometrics add to the current biographical-based exit system. Finally, they agree that the 
strength of a biometric-based exit system is identifying imposters.92 However, they do not 
address the laws passed by the U.S. Congress that mandate the implementation of “an 
automated entry and exit control system” to provide real-time data and improve database 
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search capabilities.93 Nor do they comment on recommendations from the 9/11 
Commission regarding an automated exit system’s potential to help law enforcement 
identify or apprehend potential national security threats who overstay their visas.94 
Congressional hearings have explained the possible value of an automated exit 
system when conducting visa overstay analysis.95 During testimony to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee regarding border security, Senator Chuck Grassley emphasizes that a biometric 
exit system is necessary. He remarks that gaps in the U.S. visa process have caused the 
need for an entry/exit system to know who is in the country and when they leave.96 He 
asserts that without a biometric exit method, “DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the 
immigration system by identifying and removing” visa overstays.97 Grassley argues 
against those who claim infrastructure and cost preclude an exit system. He insists that 
“this is a border and national security issue” that is necessary to control our borders.98 The 
9/11 Commission also concluded that exit tracking is an integral part of the U.S. border 
system, and it recommended that DHS complete a biometric entry/exit system.99 The 
Commission noted that this system could have helped law enforcement agencies identify 
and search for two of the 9/11 hijackers who had overstayed their visas.  
Arguments surrounding costs also present an implementation issue for border 
security agencies. Rosenblum and Hipsman believe that the infrastructure and personnel 
costs to implement a biometric exit system are not justified because a cheaper biographic 
system can function equally well.100 A 2016 study by CBP estimated it would cost 
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approximately $790 million per year in personnel costs to process departing air passengers, 
excluding infrastructure improvements.101 To offset some of these costs, Congress has 
authorized the collection of $1 billion total in new visa fees to pay for the implementation 
of such a system.102 However, in a report for the Center for Immigration Studies, Janice 
Kephart argues that first-year startup costs to deploy an exit system would only cost 
approximately $600 million and then decline.103 But while she contends that an exit system 
will lead to savings on other immigration processes and that further visa fees could offset 
additional costs, she also admits these expenses do not include infrastructure 
improvements.104 
I. BIOMETRIC EXIT SYSTEM METHODS AND GOALS 
There seems to be some dissent across the literature on the desire or utility of a 
biometric exit system. The 9/11 Commission recommended that DHS implement a 
biometric screening entry/exit system as quickly as possible.105 Congressional hearings 
have discussed the conflation of visas, overstays, screening, and a biometric exit system.106 
In testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Chairwoman Martha 
McSally indicated that without such a system in place, “visa holders can overstay their visa 
and disappear into the United States, just as 4 of the 9/11 hijackers were able to do.”107  
Other critics have argued that the implementation of any system must also include 
aggressive enforcement to apprehend and remove violators; failure to enforce the laws 
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would mean the system is only a costly illegal immigrant tracking system.108 In 1997, just 
one year after the passing of IIRIRA, a Senate Judiciary Committee report indicated that 
the automated entry/exit system outlined by Congress will only be able to provide data 
about visa overstay cases; it will not determine the intent of overstay violators, and has 
nothing to do with halting the entry of terrorists at the border.109 General immigration 
enforcement, as expressed by ICE Assistant Director John Morton in 2010, is “good 
national security work.”110 He testified that “it is important to make sure that our system 
has credibility” to keep terrorists and criminals out of the United States. During 
Congressional testimony on this issue, Former ICE Assistant Secretary Wood indicated 
that a biometric exit system would enhance enforcement efforts for these reasons, in 
addition to helping enforcement agencies prioritize overstay cases. However, she also 
stated, “the overall value of a robust biometric system is greatly diminished if the 
enforcement agencies will not enforce the violations that such a system identifies.”111   
However, the goals and methods of such a system do not seem to be clearly defined, 
especially regarding its prevention or deterrence of visa overstays. In 2016, the GAO made 
several recommendations to DHS regarding a biometric entry/exit system. These included: 
“develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit, … use tests to validate 
performance and cost estimates” and “determine whether a biometric exit is economically 
justified.”112 The Congressional Research Service also outlined questions regarding this 
issue, including: Is a biographic exit system adequate or do we need to make a biometric 
system a priority? Is third-party biographic departure data acceptable or should it be 
collected only by DHS? If it is acceptable can we enhance or leverage it, or what would 
                                                 
108 Diem Nguyen and Jena McNeil, “Biometric Exit Programs Show Need for New Strategy to 
Reduce Visa Overstays” (backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, 2010), 5. 
109 Alden, Visa Overstays, 26. 
110 Morton, Visa Overstays, 31. 
111 Wood, Implementation of an Entry/Exit System, 80. 
112 Rebecca Gambler, Immigration Enforcement: Preliminary Observations on DHS’s Overstay 
Enforcement Efforts, GAO-13-602T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2013), 15, 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-602T. 
28 
the cost be to move to a direct biometric system?113 These seem to be reasonable questions 
considering the possible implementation costs involved, but the literature on this subtopic 
does not appear to present definitive answers.  
The literature does indicate some dissent, or at least differing ideas, about what the 
goal or outcomes of such a system should be. John Wagner testified to Congress that an 
entry/exit system using both biographic and biometric data is critical to support DHS’s 
mission; he states that a biographic system “is, and will continue to be, the foundation” of 
such a system.114 He also says that CBP will further these capabilities but is committed to 
incorporating biometrics into the system. However, his testimony does not explicitly 
indicate how biometric exit processes will enhance the system or impact visa overstays. 
Wood has indicated that a biometric exit system could help identify or capture 
criminals or suspected terrorists before leaving the United States.115 Exit system 
proponents also argue that a biometric system will prevent someone from using fraudulent 
documents or false biographic data to exit the United States without repercussions.116 
These arguments do not seem to address the issue of a foreign national coming to the United 
States with the prior intention to never leave after his or her visa expires.   
HSI Assistant Director Craig Healey testified before Congress that a biometric exit 
system would “facilitate enhanced information sharing while improving the quality of the 
data, thereby improving our efficiency.”117 He further stated that a biometric exit system 
would simplify analysis reporting, making it easier to identify who has overstayed their 
visas.118 However, his comments do not explain how the facilitation or ease of analysis 
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provided by a biometric system would impact or prevent someone from overstaying a visa 
in the first place.  
Visitors to the United States may overstay the terms of their visit for a variety of 
reasons, including to commit criminal or terrorist acts; this presents a possible threat to 
U.S. security. Enforcement rates against overstay cases have been historically low, and 
recent government reports seem to indicate they have not had a deterrent effect on visa 
violators. Proponents of a biometric exit system believe its implementation will curb 
overstay violations. While a review of the literature indicates consensus on the science of 
biometrics as a useful means to identify individuals, there is some discord on the efficacy 
or necessity for such a system. A review of biometric science, related identification 
methods, and current border enforcement systems can provide some insight into the 
possible operation of such an exit system.  
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III. BIOMETRIC PROCESSES AND EXIT SYSTEMS 
A. WHAT ARE BIOMETRICS? 
The term biometrics can describe both a characteristic and a process.119 As a 
characteristic, biometrics means biological identifiers that are unique to an individual. 
Biometric traits can be anatomical, physiological, or behavioral. An individual’s signature 
and voice patterns are behavioral characteristics.120 Physiological characteristics include 
blood type and DNA, while anatomical features include fingerprints, the iris, and the 
face.121  
Anatomical characteristics are the most frequently utilized biometric markers to 
identify people.122 A subject’s identity can be verified by comparing previously 
documented traits to an existing sample.123 The idea of matching exemplar samples dates 
back to ancient times; today’s technological advancements tend to associate biometrics 
with the electronic devices used to measure them.124  
The biometric process refers to the methods used to collect and synthesize the 
characteristic data. Successfully using biometrics to verify and confirm identity requires a 
two-step method of capturing and matching data.125 The first step involves entering the 
biometric information into a database, which may occur when a law enforcement agency 
arrests a subject or when someone applies for a visa overseas. During this encounter, 
agencies review both biographical data (name, date of birth, height, weight) and biometric 
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identifiers (fingerprints, photo, iris scan, etc.). The agency will code the subject’s data and 
capture it in a database with a unique identifier.126 The system will search the database to 
compare the biometric data and store it for future reference. A biometric match will occur 
when the subject is queried in the database again.127 For example, when a foreign national 
applies for a visa abroad, the Department of State collects his or her biometric data. When 
the foreign national arrives at the U.S. border, CBP also obtains this biometric data and 
searches for any matches to verify the person’s identity. 
The use of biometric identifiers is critical within the homeland security enterprise 
because it has several distinct advantages over biographical data. Biometrics are not easily 
lost or shared; people cannot lie about their biometrics, and they are either unchangeable 
or highly resistant to alteration.128 When apprehended at the border or inside the United 
States, a foreign national may try to present an alias or false identification. A biometric 
scan can quickly locate a matching record to reveal if the person is lying about his or her 
identity, has been previously deported, or matches a national security database; the lack of 
a match could mean the person has entered the United States without inspection.129 
Relying solely on biographical data could miss this information.  
B. BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS AND CAPABILITIES 
Several technological methods can capture biometric markers for entry into a 
database. However, in a law enforcement or homeland security environment, a biometric 
technology system is only as good as the size of its component database. Even the most 
accurate biometric identification system will be ineffective if it does not have a large 
dataset for comparison. Typical examples of biometric capture techniques include using 
fingerprints, iris/retinal scans, facial recognition, or DNA.130 
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1. Fingerprints 
Fingerprint readers capture an image of a subject’s fingerprint and mathematically 
encode it into a representative pattern.131 Optically scanning all ten of a subject’s 
fingerprints (along with taking their photo) is the primary method utilized by DHS border 
enforcement and other law enforcement agencies to obtain an individual’s biometrics.  
2. Iris/Retinal Scan 
Camera scans of the eye utilize an infrared image to recognize and save patterns in 
the iris of a subject.132 These scans are accurate and unique but usually require the 
cooperation of the individual to sit still for the scan. This process can be intrusive and 
difficult to obtain if the person is resistant. To date, DHS has focused primarily on 
obtaining fingerprints and does not have a large iris or retinal database for identity 
verification comparison.133 
3. Facial Recognition  
Law enforcement agencies today generally take photos of arrestees, but facial 
recognition goes further to make individual measurements at different points on a person’s 
face.134 These data points then create a unique biometric identifier for the subject. The 
subject does not need to cooperate fully to undergo a facial scan, unlike a retinal scan.135 
DHS’s facial recognition comparison database is also not very large compared to captured 
fingerprints. 
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4. DNA  
DNA sampling provides a definitive biometric indicator but it is a complicated 
process requiring multiple steps and is not instantaneous.136 It is also intrusive because it 
involves a physical sample; the costs and result times are higher than for other biometric 
identifiers.137 DNA can be useful in cases where blood or other bodily material may be the 
only biometric information available. For border enforcement agencies, DNA can 
biometrically identify someone and establish that person’s relationships with other 
subjects, such as when familial units cross the border together or in human trafficking 
cases.138   
C. BIOMETRICS AND DHS   
Law enforcement’s use of biometric data to identify subjects is not new. The first 
use of fingerprints as a biometric identifier dates back to 1892.139 The FBI’s creation of a 
fingerprint repository dates back to 1924.140 An overwhelming number of paper 
fingerprint cards requiring visual analysis led to the development of the Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS).141 AFIS automated the comparison and 
deciphering of fingerprint card templates using computerization. Technological 
advancements have led to the development of optical fingerprint readers that can capture 
fingerprints and compare them to the AFIS database in almost real time.142  
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As fingerprint capture technology developed, communication among various 
agencies and their fingerprint systems became difficult. To ensure effective communication 
between agencies, the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) 
went online in July 1999.143 The FBI maintains IAFIS, which contains fingerprint images 
for 64 million people; it allows local, state, and tribal agencies to access and exchange 
biometric data twenty-four hours per day.144 Federal agencies, including DHS border 
enforcement agencies, also connect to the IAFIS system.  
Currently, DHS border agencies utilize the Automated Biometric Identification 
System (IDENT) as the primary system to capture biometric data from travelers and 
connect with IAFIS.145 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) developed 
IDENT in 1994 as its central biometric system. IDENT stores and processes biometric data, 
primarily fingerprints and photographs, as well as some facial images and iris scans. It then 
links these biometrics with stored data to establish and verify identities as foreign travelers 
enter or exit the United States.146  
Border agency use of travelers’ biometric data propagated the need for data 
management and technology support. In 2004, DHS established the U.S. Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to serve as the steward of 
DHS biometric data and to support border enforcement agencies.147 US-VISIT and IDENT 
can biometrically identify foreign nationals entering, exiting, or residing within the United 
States using comprehensive database searches; the resulting identifiers can then be 
gathered, stored, and shared among users.148 
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Biometric technology provides DHS agencies with the capability to verify a 
subject’s identity. This verification permits agencies to make front-line decisions regarding 
a foreign national’s admission to the United States, eligibility for benefits, fugitive status, 
or threat to national security, or to determine if someone has overstayed a visa.149 The 
IDENT system stores foreign nationals’ biometric data and compares it against watch lists 
for terrorists, criminals, or prior immigration violators.150 IDENT also reviews the entire 
database of fingerprints to identify the use of aliases, fraudulent documentation, or visa 
overstays.151  
In 2013, the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) made US-VISIT 
the biometric services steward for DHS.152 As more foreign visitors travel to the United 
States, the IDENT system has begun to exceed its capacity. OBIM and DHS are currently 
collaborating to replace IDENT with the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology 
(HART) system. HART will allow DHS to match, store, share, and analyze more data than 
IDENT.153 It will also provide DHS with the next generation of biometric capture and 
identification technology by adding iris and facial recognition capabilities.  
D. BIOMETRIC ISSUES AND CHALLENGES  
Biometric identifiers can provide an invaluable tool for border enforcement 
agencies. The ability to verify an individual’s identity based on previously captured traits 
can assist in the identification, apprehension, and removal of visa overstay violators. 
However, as described below, the very characteristics and attributes of biometrics could 
have an impact on policies and implementation related to biometric identification systems. 
DHS should be aware of these implications, especially, when considering the use of a 
biometric system to identify individuals who overstay their visas. 
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Biometric data is only useful if agencies can share it quickly and securely. This 
presents a challenge if interoperability or communication issues exist between agencies. 
While many state and local agencies interface with federal databases, some do not. Some 
agencies may not have automated interface capabilities to enter an arrestee’s fingerprints 
into the system promptly.154 Even with today’s technological advancements, some 
agencies still do not fingerprint every subject they arrest, so IAFIS may not be complete 
with arrestee data.  
This lack of a complete biometric database in IAFIS has implications for the visa 
overstay problem. A critical resource for DHS’s fight against overstays is the ability to 
identify, locate, and apprehend visa violators. If a local, municipal, or state agency arrests 
a visa overstay violator and captures his or her biometrics, IAFIS will automatically notify 
DHS. DHS can then take the appropriate enforcement action. If that agency does not 
fingerprint or capture the subject’s biometrics, DHS will not be able to take action against 
that overstay violator.    
Historically, using fingerprint scans as a biometric identifier has shown to be 
reasonably accurate and cost-effective.155 However, in his thesis titled “Biometrics and 
Counterterrorism,” Todd Moore notes that fingerprints may not work for every subject (for 
example, people with skin conditions or amputated fingers, or who have been in prior 
accidents).156 Moore asserts that technological advancements may overcome this hurdle 
in the future. ICE frequently interacts with subjects who work in industries that could 
impact the viability of high-quality fingerprints. If a subject’s biometrics were first enrolled 
with optimal prints and they are encountered with poor prints, there may not be a match in 
the system, which will thus fail to identify the subject correctly.157  
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In cases where fingerprints may be unreadable or return no match in a database, iris 
or facial scans may be a more accurate identifier because these biometric markers are less 
susceptible to environmental impacts such as employment-related injuries.158 Another 
advantage of facial recognition technology is that fingerprints may not always be available 
for reference. For example, a terrorist bombing may leave behind no biometric evidence, 
but a surveillance camera may have captured a suspect’s facial image. Iris or facial scans 
may provide a higher level of identification or could be utilized if fingerprints are not 
available.  
A limited comparison dataset is also another drawback of facial recognition 
technology. Border enforcement agencies may not be able to identify someone if that 
person’s face is not in the database. Fingerprints, however, are a key part of the current 
IDENT database since DHS has amassed a trove of data on travel history, visas, and 
criminal records.159 Law enforcement and border agencies can utilize this data to identify 
an unknown individual.160  
Another challenge with biometric data collection methods is that these 
characteristics and processes are not infallible. The accuracy of a biometric match is only 
as good as the sample entered into the system. Data captured in a controlled setting will 
likely be of higher quality due to optimal conditions (for example, in a well-lit area where 
the subject is standing still).161 If the data used for verification is of poor quality, it could 
affect the possibility of achieving an accurate match.162 This could generate errors or false 
departure alerts that would require additional manpower to review and rectify; these types 
of issues are what having a biometric exit system is trying to avoid in the first place.  
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E. BIOMETRIC EXIT SYSTEMS 
Secure borders are a critical component of a sovereign nation. In a capitalist 
democracy such as the United States, this need for security is balanced by the need to 
facilitate free trade, and the flow of goods and people both into and out of the country. A 
fundamental goal of immigration law is to identify and keep threats to our interests outside 
our borders.163 One way for a country to manage its borders is to identify, admit, and track 
the foreign nationals who pass through its ports of entry.  
In 1996, Congress passed the IIRIRA to partly address the issue of entry and 
departure verification of foreign travelers and errors created by prior systems. This act 
included the development of automated systems related to border security, stating: 
Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Attorney General shall develop an automated entry and exit control system 
that will enable the Attorney General to identify, through on-line searching 
procedures, lawfully admitted nonimmigrants who remain in the United 
States beyond the period authorized by the Attorney General.164 
IIRIRA instituted the legal requirement for an automated visa entry/exit control 
system at the U.S. border. Its goal was to move away from the paper-driven I-94 system to 
quickly obtain data from departing foreign visitors and identify those who had violated 
their visa requirements. The implementation of IDENT and US-VISIT seemed to satisfy 
most of the provisions of this act. Third-party carriers were automatically transmitting 
passenger manifests to border agency databases for overstay review. Border agencies could 
conduct these queries online and remotely. Also, the automated ADIS system would close 
out the arrival records of departing foreign nationals to track potential overstays.165    
However, following the tragic events of 9/11, it was determined that the United 
States needed to improve its ability to identify foreign nationals crossing the border, 
including visa overstays.166 Congress has passed multiple bills regarding border security 
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and systems to track visitors at the border. Three main acts, however, provide the guidelines 
for a biometric entry/exit system: the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and the 
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2013.167  
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. § 1365b) 
codified the requirements for a biometric exit system from five other statutes: IIRIRA, the 
INS Data Management Improvement Act, the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act, and the USA PATRIOT Act.168 Congress 
stated that “completing a biometric entry and exit data system as expeditiously as possible 
is an essential investment in efforts to protect the United States by preventing the entry of 
terrorists.”169 The act states that DHS’s goal should be a biometric entry/exit system that:  
1) serves as a vital counterterrorism tool; 2) screens travelers efficiently in 
a welcoming manner; 3) provides inspectors with adequate real-time 
information; 4) ensures flexibility of training and security protocols to most 
effectively comply with security mandates; 5) integrates relevant databases 
and plans for database modifications to address volume increase and 
database usage; and 6) improves database search capacities by using 
language algorithms to detect alternate names.170 
This act added the requirement for using biometric traits to identify subjects in the 
entry/exit system, rather than the previous standard of using only biographical information. 
A U.S. statute now included the recommendation from the 9/11 Commission that an 
entry/exit system be not only automated but biometrically based as well. As a result, there 
was now a differentiation between the “automated entry/exit” system as described in 
IIRIRA and a “biometric” exit system. Furthermore, the exit system was mandated to 
capture data from foreign nationals regardless of where they crossed the border.171  
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One aim of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was to complete 
a biometric entry/exit system to “protect the United States by preventing the entry of 
terrorists.”172 It merely provides guidelines for DHS and biometric entry/exit system goals. 
It does not outline specifics for enforcement, nor does it address how DHS or its component 
agencies will address visa overstays; neither “enforcement” nor “visa overstays” appear 
anywhere in the act itself.  
Before 9/11, border officials would often not know who was coming to the United 
States until receiving a biographical manifest, usually only a few hours before the flight 
arrived. This was especially true with visitors coming from nations included in the Visa 
Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Travelers from VWP nations could travel to the United 
States without the need for a visa (and the requisite screening that comes with obtaining 
one).173 As a result, border enforcement agencies would not know who was attempting to 
enter the country until the last minute.  
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, section 
711, sought to address the weaknesses in the VWP and border controls identified by the 
9/11 Commission. Section 711 specifies the creation of the Electronic Travel Authorization 
System (ETAS) to “collect such biographical and other information … to determine, in 
advance of travel ... whether there exists a law enforcement or security risk” of a particular 
individual traveling to the United States under the VWP.174 This act also placed the onus 
of collecting passenger biometric exit data and transmitting arrival and departure 
information on commercial carriers.175 The last subsection of section 711 also delineates 
system requirements for an exit system, which was to have been established by 2008. 
Congress dictated that the system shall match biometric identifiers taken from foreign 
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nationals against terrorist and immigration watchlists, and also compare them to air carrier 
departure manifests to ensure that visitors depart the United States.  
The Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2013 (Public Law 113-6) further 
streamlined the agencies responsibilities for implementing a biometric entry/exit system. 
This bill replaced US-VISIT with OBIM as the primary biometric identity program for the 
U.S. government.176 As a result of this realignment, CBP now holds the responsibility for 
planning and deploying a biometric exit system, while visa overstay analysis has shifted to 
ICE.177 By separating the duties regarding biometric exit development, data management, 
and overstay analysis, congressional appropriators moved border enforcement agencies to 
act and again reaffirmed the legal requirement to implement a biometric exit system. 
F. DHS/CBP BIOMETRIC EXIT SYSTEM PILOT PROGRAMS 
Following the restructuring of responsibilities for biometrics at the border, CBP 
developed several exit test programs beginning in 2015. These initial tests would evaluate 
the use of biometric exit technology and processes.178 An efficient biometric exit system 
should meet several criteria, such as accurately matching subjects to existing databases; 
should be intuitive and easy to use by the traveling public; be stable enough to handle any 
changes in biometric characteristics over time; and complete biometric matching rapidly 
to avoid unnecessary delays.179 The goal of CBP’s pilot projects was to utilize biometric 
technology in a realistic border environment to identify implementation issues and aid in 
the development of an efficient biometric exit solution.  
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1. BE-Mobile Fingerprint Program 
In 2015, CBP piloted the BE-Mobile exit program at high-volume airports in the 
United States.180 CBP officers in airport jetways scanned the fingerprints of departing 
foreign nationals. CBP officials noted that the technology was capable of capturing, 
matching, and validating information in the biometric databases; however, they also stated 
that time and staffing considerations did not make this a viable solution for all departing 
flights.181  
The BE-Mobile pilot indicated that using fingerprints for a biometric exit system 
could accurately match subjects contained in a database; the system also appears to work 
relatively intuitively for subjects. However, the CBP study indicated that thoroughly 
conducting the exit verification of even a moderate-size flight using 2015 technology was 
too time consuming. Also, while there is an extensive database of fingerprints to search for 
violators, fingerprints can degrade with age, type of work, injury, weight, or other issues. 
Other types of biometric capture technology may alleviate the problems of speed and 
stability.  
2. Departure Information Systems Test 
In 2016, CBP piloted the Departure Information Systems Test. This pilot tested the 
ability of facial recognition technology to match the photograph of a departing subject to 
existing database images.182 During this test, passengers boarding selected outbound 
flights in Atlanta, Georgia, presented their boarding pass and had a picture of their face 
captured. The system then compared the departing photograph to images within DHS 
passport, visa, and enforcement databases (however, this program only performed the 
image matching after the flight had departed).183 For this test, CBP selected a flight leaving 
from a gate with ample space for the capture technology to be set up, something that may 
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not be possible everywhere; CBP also selected a flight that departed during a “lull” so 
staffing of the system would not be an issue.184 In the same report, CBP also noted that 
incorporating a second biometric indicator in conjunction with the facial scan would be a 
good backup if no match was found. 
Like the fingerprint biometric exit pilot, the facial recognition pilot appears to have 
accurately matched records in a database. However, this technology could pose some 
challenges for ease of use and may require staffing to assist travelers. When instructed to 
“look at the camera” for a facial scan, many travelers looked at any camera they could see 
(CCTV, etc.) rather than the actual scan camera.185 Facial recognition programs can be 
affected by age just like fingerprints; they can also be impacted by alterations to the face, 
including glasses, facial hair, or clothing.186 Also, the dataset size of facial scans for 
comparison could have an impact on accuracy.  
3. Border System Iris Scans 
CBP also conducted a pilot at the Otay Mesa land border crossing in California in 
2016 to test the efficacy of biometric systems in an outdoor land environment.187 This test 
collected biographic and biometric information using facial and iris scans of subjects 
crossing into Mexico. CBP indicated that space and environmental weather considerations 
would be factors in a “live” scenario using biometric technology.188 Another drawback to 
iris scans is the current lack of a sizable database for comparison.  
4. CBP AEER—Apex Air Entry/Exit Re-engineering Program 
To continue biometric entry and exit system testing in an environment with real 
people, CBP developed AEER—the Apex Air Entry/Exit Re-engineering Program. This 
25,000 square foot facility allows fifty live test subjects to simulate border processing at a 
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port of entry. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate reports that using live subjects 
to test human interaction with the technology is critical for success.189 The facility can test 
both entry and exit processing to help CBP further hone exit systems for utilization in a 
real airport.190 Testing multiple technology systems allows CBP to improve efficiency 
while continuing to research and develop biometric processes for an exit system.  
5. Air Exit/TSA Screening Pilot 
In 2009, DHS conducted a biometric exit test for international passengers in 
Atlanta. This project used TSA officers to screen departing foreign passengers 
biometrically.191 TSA officers used scanners to capture the biometrics of departing foreign 
passengers as they passed through TSA checkpoints. This project successfully identified 
30,000 legitimate exiting foreigners while screening 500,000 total passengers. However, 
the primary issue was separating departing foreigners from other domestic passengers.192 
The use of separate screening lines could alleviate that issue, although capturing data on 
departing passengers away from the gate could lead to false departure records if a passenger 
passes security but does not board the plane.  
6. Facial Recognition Airline Boarding 
Commercial airlines have recently begun incorporating biometric technology into 
the boarding process for international flights. This procedure expedites the boarding 
process and helps airlines satisfy the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act by collecting exiting passengers’ biometric data.193 Several foreign and 
domestic carriers have installed facial recognition technology at boarding gates in various 
airports. This program is similar to the 2016 Departure Information System test conducted 
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by CBP. However, technological improvements now allow this to occur in real time. This 
scan also serves as the boarding pass for the plane, streamlining the boarding process while 
transmitting biometric exit verification data to CBP.194 Exit verification upon boarding 
also helps to ensure the subject departs, rather than doing so at check-in or the TSA 
checkpoint when the traveler could still leave the airport.    
Recent DHS tests indicate that biometric technology is capable of conducting exit 
verifications of foreign visitors. Collaboration with commercial carriers at some airports 
shows that implementing an automated biometric exit system is feasible in a real-world 
environment, without detrimental effects on aviation operations. Other nations also deal 
with visa overstay enforcement issues, and some have implemented biometric immigration 
systems as a result. A review of other nations’ actions on these issues could provide the 
United States with a head start on policy issues when dealing with visa overstays and efforts 
to combat them.   
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF VISA OVERSTAY 
ENFORCEMENT AND BIOMETRICS IN OTHER NATIONS 
The United States is not the only sovereign nation balancing border security with 
the flow of legitimate trade and travelers to its shores, nor is it the only nation that has to 
address visa overstay enforcement as a matter of immigration policy. It is also not the only 
nation working on the use of a biometric technology system to enforce immigration laws 
at the border. Many of these nations are similar to the United States in regard to number of 
international travelers, technological capabilities, and democratic form of government, 
including the United Kingdom and members of the European Union.  
Other nations, though they may not match the United States in size or type of 
government, have also implemented biometric exit systems. In contrast, autocratic 
government immigration policies can focus on regime stability, and their deportation 
procedures are geared toward expeditious removals of foreign visitors.195 As a result, such 
governments do not offer a useful comparison to issues faced by representative 
democracies, where immigration violators are afforded due process and other protections. 
A comparative analysis of other democratic nations’ efforts could shed light on the 
effectiveness of biometric exit systems and visa overstay enforcement.  
A. EUROPEAN UNION 
In 1985, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the 
Schengen Agreement with the goal of creating a Europe without internal borders.196 The 
establishment of the European Union (EU) and the later addition of twenty-one other 
nations means that countries in the Schengen Area no longer conduct internal border 
security checks. However, removing these frontiers has resulted in the increased need for 
cooperation among EU nations. The European Commission explains that establishing 
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common rules regarding border inspections, visa issuance, and immigration enforcement 
is important for EU border control and security.197 
In 2016, the EU sought to centralize border controls and established FRONTEX, 
the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.198 FRONTEX’s goal is to coordinate 
border security systems between EU and non-EU nations.199 FRONTEX allows each 
member nation to maintain a national border force, as well as make refugee and migration 
decisions under the universal EU plan. FRONTEX can supplement a nation’s border force 
with rapid response teams but it does not replace national border guards.200 For example, 
Poland deploys national patrols to conduct visa checks at train stations and other public 
places with the goal of identifying visa violators.201  
The European Union has begun incorporating technology into border security and 
visa overstay enforcement efforts. The Schengen Information System (SIS) allows nations 
to share information on persons using biometric identifiers to increase functionality and 
reduce instances of fraud, forged documents, or altered biographical information.202 The 
SIS is also invalidating travel documents of suspected foreign terrorist fighters traveling 
abroad.203 Biometrics in an exit control system can identify foreign fighters trying to 
depart the EU using an alias or fraudulent documents. If their identity and biometrics are 
known, a biometric exit system could alert authorities before they leave the EU.  
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The European Council also implemented the Visa Information System (VIS), 
which contains biometric data related to Schengen visa applications. This standard system, 
consisting mainly of fingerprints, allows member nations to access biometric data to verify 
visa holders, detect fraud, or identify visa overstays.204 These technology systems will 
enable EU member nations to enhance their immigration screening efforts.  
In 2008, the European Commission identified the need to create an automated 
Entry/Exist System (EES) to secure the EU’s external borders further. This system would 
automatically record the entry and exit data of all third country nationals at the EU border 
to identify visa overstay cases, as well as conduct other database security checks.205 The 
EES would utilize biometric identifiers and interface with the VIS and SIS systems; if a 
third country national’s visa expired without proof of departure in the database, the proper 
authorities would be alerted.206  
In 2009, the European Parliament released a report regarding the EES and the next 
steps needed for border management in the European Union.207 Parliament indicated there 
is little definitive data to identify how many visa overstay violators were currently in the 
EU. While this report mentioned an estimated 8 million illegal immigrants inside the EU 
in 2006, Parliament called for better clarification of the problem. Furthermore, Parliament 
doubted the absolute need to implement a biometric exit system given the expected costs 
needed to achieve it.  
The same report also indicated Parliament’s belief that the EES system alone would 
not work; “further contact with law enforcement agencies is still necessary for an individual 
who overstays” to be apprehended.208 Parliament further commented that while the 
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proposed system might provide some deterrence, they did not believe “that the proposed 
system will put an end to the overstay phenomenon as such.”209 Academics in the EU also 
echoed this point. The EES system is primarily focusing on those leaving who present 
themselves for departure at the border; it would not be able to catch those choosing to 
remain in the EU past their visa date who do not report at a border to leave.210 As a result, 
“the objective of the EES to catch visa-overstayers is not entirely viable.”211 
Further review of the EES by the European Commission led to the proposal of the 
“Smart Borders” initiative in 2013.212 This initiative refined the 2008 proposal as a way 
to improve border management, provide information on visa overstays, and facilitate 
border travel while improving security. The new system would improve checks on third 
country nationals at external borders, identify those in the Schengen area illegally, and 
combat terrorism and transnational crime.213 The European Agency for the operational 
management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the area of freedom, security, and justice (eu-
LISA) would administer the new EES database containing visa, criminal, immigration, and 
biometric information.214 
A 2015 Smart Borders pilot test examined several biometric capture methodologies 
and system types. The pilot found that capturing fingerprints was feasible at all kinds of 
borders and that taking four prints took less time than ten. The pilot report showed a 99.3 
percent matching accuracy using four fingerprints and a known database; using eight 
fingerprints took twice as long to process and to verify ten prints took almost three times 
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as long.215 The report also assessed that commercial-off-the-shelf systems were sufficient 
enough to capture facial images for face verification, especially when comparing a live 
image to one stored on an e-type passport.  
Testing by eu-LISA also found iris scans were a viable biometric identifier in 
conjunction with fingerprints or facial scans. The test indicated the capture success was 
high for enrolling iris data and it added only a limited amount of time and can use current 
technologies. However, iris scans were affected by certain environmental conditions and 
types of border crossings. Weather conditions, direct sun, dust, sand, and wind could all 
impact an outdoor iris scan system.216 
B. UNITED KINGDOM 
The U.K. Home Office is the lead department for immigration enforcement, border 
security, and visa issuance, and for defending the U.K. from terrorism.217 Home Office 
agencies responsible for these enforcement efforts include the Border Force, Immigration 
Enforcement (IE), and U.K. Visas and Immigration. The Border Force secures the U.K.’s 
border while facilitating the travel of people and goods, much like CBP. IE is responsible 
for tracking and apprehending immigration offenders, including visa overstay cases.218 IE 
functions much like U.S. ICE, but IE officers also work at airports and seaports. The U.K. 
Visas and Immigration office issues visas to foreign visitors and handles citizenship and 
asylum decisions; it has roles similar to USCIS. 
In 2017, a Scottish government minister echoed the prevailing sentiment that “the 
biggest problem the U.K. has is people overstaying their visas.”219 Like the United States, 
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the U.K. has had difficulty determining how many people are residing there without legal 
right. Estimates place the number around 618,000 people living illegally in the U.K. since 
2007; researchers generally concur that many of them have overstayed their visas, but the 
U.K. Home Office does not publish exact figures on this data.220 
U.K. immigration laws empower police officers to conduct immigration checks 
while performing other duties. During a traffic stop, for example, police are expected to 
perform immigration checks if they are not satisfied with a subject’s lawful status.221 
Beginning in 2012, the Home Office started “Operation Nexus” to improve the 
apprehension and removal of persons deemed to be risks to the public or who did not have 
lawful presence in the U.K. by placing IE officers at police stations.222  
Operation Nexus was not without its critics, and it generated some discord among 
police officers who felt the immigration checks impacted their normal police work.223 
Even still, a 2014 Home Office report reported the program did show some success.224 
Operation Nexus led to a 37 percent increase in the number of immigration violators 
identified by local police and a 158 percent increase in the number of violators who left the 
U.K. after a police encounter. The report also noted the removal of eighty-five high-profile 
offenders identified during the operational timeframe. In 2016, 39,626 foreign nationals 
were removed from the U.K. or voluntarily left after being encountered by U.K. 
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immigration officials.225 Operation Nexus also helped establish a link between Home 
Office and police identity databases. It enabled immigration officials in the U.K. to utilize 
biographic identity documents to confirm nationality in conjunction with Home Office 
biometric database checks.226  
Local IE teams work to conduct criminal and administrative arrests of foreign 
nationals who are not legally present in the U.K.227 These teams also perform workplace 
enforcement operations to ensure employers are complying with immigration law and to 
apprehend and remove immigration violators, including visa overstays. However, U.K. IE 
has been criticized for lack of enforcement against employment violators. A 2018 article 
by The Guardian indicated that IE only visited 20 percent of employers in recent years and 
that the agency “lacks the information needed … to ensure that rules are complied with.”228 
The article further states that IE does not currently enforce rules ensuring that employers 
make sure their workers or recruits leave at the expiration of their visa. Immigration 
Minister Damian Green indicated he wants action taken against employers who violate 
immigration law so they will lose their ability to sponsor future migrants. “I want 
enforcement and compliance to be the cornerstone of our immigration system,” Green 
stated.229  
In recent years, the U.K. has taken new measures to increase enforcement efforts 
against immigration violators. The 2014 Immigration Bill aimed to “create a really hostile 
environment for illegal migrants.”230 Some elements of the bill include allowing 
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deportation of subjects prior to case appeal decisions; sharing police victim and witness 
information with IE; requiring banks, employers, landlords, and health care providers to 
check immigration databases on subjects; making it illegal to “drive whilst unlawfully in 
the U.K.”; and restricting bail decisions for some immigration detainees. The Home Office 
circulated “Go Home” vans in some London neighborhoods to advertise programs that 
overstay violators could contact for assistance to return home (the Home Office eventually 
ended the controversial program).231 To help prevent visa overstays, then Home Secretary 
Theresa May directed non-EU foreign students to depart the U.K. immediately after 
finishing their courses, and required students to return home and apply for a new U.K. visa 
if they wanted to change their course of study or get a job.232  
U.K. border enforcement agencies have begun utilizing biometric exit systems at 
some of their airports. At the Manchester Airport, travelers have their facial images taken 
on arrival into the terminal and again upon entering their departing flight.233 Other airports 
in the U.K. are expanding these systems as well. This departure process ensures that foreign 
travelers leave the U.K. 
C. INDIA 
The Government of India has implemented a large-scale biometric program to 
provide every resident of India with a unique identifier to eliminate aliases and false names, 
and rapidly authenticate identification.234 This program relies on the government to 
capture and store ten fingerprints, two retinal scans, a photograph, and essential 
biographical data for every resident of India. The implementation of the Unique 
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Identification Number (UID, or Aadhaar) is the largest biometric identity project in the 
world, currently containing 1.3 billion individuals.235  
Residents of India will use the UID as identity confirmation for government 
benefits, online identity verification, and international travel.236 While immigration checks 
and faster security clearance at airports are one benefit of the UID system, it was not 
explicitly developed as an entry/exit system for foreign travelers. However, the vast size 
of the Aadhaar biometric repository indicates that it is able to capture, store, and utilize 
biometric identifiers from a large populace. It demonstrates that fingerprints and iris scans 
could be used quickly as a way to perform a verification to confirm the identity of a subject.  
D. OTHER BIOMETRIC EXIT SYSTEMS ABROAD 
Other nations have also implemented biometric exit systems at their borders. Some 
of these nations may only have one sizeable international airport requiring an exit system, 
or their traveler volume makes it easier to process every passenger exiting the country 
without serious delays. Many European and newer African airports were designed to 
incorporate exit system infrastructure in their terminal design, unlike U.S. airports where 
international and domestic flights may depart in the same terminal. However, these systems 
demonstrate that biometric exit technologies are feasible at a border.  
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was one of the first nations to implement a 
biometric exit control system to ensure deported foreign nationals did not return using fake 
biographic data.237 The UAE has tested biometric boarding gates that will scan passengers’ 
faces and irises as they board the plane to verify the departure of foreign nationals.238 
Saudi Arabia has implemented a similar system to prevent overstays and identify possible 
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security threats during the Hajj pilgrimage.239 Senegal’s biometric exit system verifies the 
departure of all foreign passengers, as there is no other way to exit the airport. However, 
Dakar only has one international airport with infrequent departures and a moderate volume 
of passengers requiring exit processing. Other nations, including Latvia, New Zealand, and 
the Netherlands, have begun using biometric exit gates for security and when passengers 
board departing flights.240 Each of these nations relies on facial recognition or fingerprints 
to automatically confirm a subject’s identity at the boarding gate and compare it to his or 
her airline reservation and e-Passport before allowing the passenger to board.  
E. SUMMARY 
The homeland security experiences of other countries can help identify effective 
practices for modification within for the United States. Applying this data to U.S. border 
enforcement agencies provides a starting point for policy development, rather than having 
to begin from scratch. Such a comparative review of foreign overstay enforcement efforts 
and biometric systems can provide policy guidance options and analysis for U.S. decision 
makers on these issues.  
Some of the advantages of a biometric exit system are evident in the EU and other 
nations around the globe. Many countries are beginning to move away from biographic 
identifiers to the use of biometric identification. This shift improves a nation’s ability to 
improve border management and immigration enforcement. For example, the SIS system 
in the EU could use biometric identifiers to identify potential terrorist fighters before they 
leave the country to fight, or upon return, if their biometrics are known. Other nations have 
started implementing biometric-based airline boarding gates that could incorporate similar 
exit control systems. 
However, some critics, including the European Parliament and scholars, have 
indicated that enforcement is still necessary to address visa overstay cases and other 
immigration violations. Immigration officials in the U.K. have also stressed the need for 
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enforcement and compliance to uphold immigration law and border sovereignty. They state 
that technology alone will not address subjects who willfully refuse to depart upon the 
expiration of their visa; law enforcement will still need to identify and interact with these 
violators to ensure they are apprehended and removed. A biometric system alone will not 
provide this enforcement interaction.   
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V. POLICY OPTIONS AND ANALYSIS 
Various policy options are available for DHS to effectively address the problem of 
visa overstay violators. DHS border enforcement agencies could maintain the status quo, 
relying on biographical exit-based systems with the occasional “surge” of biometric 
systems at some airports. DHS could complete the installation of a biometric-based exit 
system at air and seaports across the United States while maintaining current enforcement 
levels. Or DHS could create a combination of these methods by installing biometric exit 
systems while simultaneously increasing enforcement against visa overstay violators. 
A biometric exit system can be a useful tool for enforcing U.S. immigration laws. 
Fifteen airports across the United States currently utilize some form of biometric exit 
system, primarily facial recognition scans for boarding, as previously described. While the 
installation of these systems has increased, many locations use them only for specific 
flights or during certain times of the day.241 Proponents of a biometric exit system tout its 
ability to diminish time spent chasing false leads, prevent future visitors from overstaying 
their visas, and rapidly identify visa overstays cases. Biometrics would also address the 
possibility of an imposter using someone else’s name to depart from the country, or a 
national security target trying to leave without authorities receiving any notice.242 To be 
sure, these benefits appear valuable for helping DHS enforce immigration law and 
protecting our nation. A biometric exit system could have a positive impact on several 
weaknesses surrounding visa overstay enforcement.  
Even with these positive impacts, a biometric exit system will not drag overstay 
violators to the border and make them physically depart the United States, nor will it help 
enforcement agencies locate and apprehend them. Indeed, some opponents to an exit 
system have argued that the goal of border enforcement should be to prevent terrorists and 
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criminals from even entering the United States.243 Without a commitment to enforcing 
visa overstay laws, technology alone will not likely have an impact on people who choose 
to overstay their visas in violation of the law. Failing to apprehend and remove these 
violators will not dissuade others from doing the same, thus leaving a gap in homeland 
security. Consequently, implementing an exit system will not have a dramatic impact on 
overstay violators without additional enforcement action by DHS.  
A. POLICY OPTION A—STATUS QUO 
Under a status quo policy, exit departure verification procedures would remain the 
same. CBP would utilize existing biometric exit technology that has already been tested, 
purchased, and installed at some locations. CBP would continue to conduct spot checks on 
various flights or at multiple airports using existing mobile biometric data terminals to 
establish baseline compliance and visa exit data for annual reporting. The transmission of 
biographic manifests by carriers would provide the primary data for overstay analysis. 
Existing interior enforcement procedures would also stay in place. ICE would identify 
overstay cases via the CTCEU and refer national security threats to HSI for possible 
investigation. ERO would receive other overstay cases for location, apprehension, and 
removal but would not specifically target visa overstay cases.  
The current biographical exit verification system has been in place for well over a 
decade. This system does have some positives; CBP and other DHS enforcement agencies 
already use it in their efforts to enforce U.S. immigration law. Commercial aviation and 
sea carriers routinely transmit arriving and departing passenger manifests for review. DHS 
computer systems can automatically check this data for wanted criminals or terrorists who 
may be trying to evade the law or escape the United States.  
Maintaining the status quo with a biographic-based exit system would incur little 
to no additional cost to DHS. Database systems for manifest review and visa research are 
already in place. These systems require regular upgrades and maintenance, but there would 
be no new costs for installing biometric exit technology. Likewise, potentially expensive 
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modifications to airports, seaports, and the land border would not be necessary to facilitate 
the flow of people and goods departing the United States. Training and staffing costs would 
also be minimal with existing systems, as it would not be necessary to hire new officers. 
While staffing levels may increase due to a natural increase in passenger traffic, additional 
staff would not be required to conduct biometric exit operations or assist passengers in the 
departure process.  
Enhancements to the biographical exit system have improved DHS’s ability to 
address previous data backlogs to identify overstay violators.244 This has allowed DHS to 
integrate automation and match relevant data across law enforcement systems to “quickly 
and accurately identify overstays … to reduce their occurrence in the future.”245 Continued 
biographic system enhancements will allow DHS to eliminate future case backlogs, target 
overstay cases of concern, and automatically close out cases.  
The current biographical exit system has also had previous success in identifying 
terror suspects trying to alight from the United States. In 2015, CBP arrested 379 airline 
passengers with outstanding arrest warrants based on electronic data received from 
carriers.246 In another example, in 2010 CBP apprehended Faisal Shahzad, the suspected 
Times Square bomber, after receiving a departure manifest from an airline.247 Shahzad 
and other criminals are frequently apprehended by CBP without the use of a biometric 
system upon departure.  
CBP has also enhanced its biographic exit-based systems. For example, CBP has 
now automated the I-94 arrival/departure record to maintain entry and exit data 
electronically.248 Foreign visitors can access their information online as needed. The 
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electronic I-94 will be updated to show the visitor has left once the carrier transmits the 
passenger manifest to CBP. This eliminates the possibility of lost forms or improperly 
entered data, which increases the accuracy of the biographic exit data used for overstay 
analysis.  
Finally, CBP has launched new initiatives to gain traveler compliance from foreign 
visitors. VWP participants can utilize the CBP website to check their visa status while in 
the United States; CBP will also email VWP travelers ten days before the expiration of 
their admission period as a reminder.249 This system may eventually include all visitors 
with a visa. Efforts such as this may increase overstay compliance using existing data and 
information, possibly reducing the need for a biometric-based system.   
Foreign nationals who arrive in the United States via an airport but then leave across 
the land border pose a unique challenge for tracking overstay cases. Since 2012, the 
Beyond the Border partnership between the United States and Canada has addressed some 
exit verification issues on the northern border using a biographic-based system.250 Under 
this agreement, when a non-U.S. or non-Canadian citizen leaves the United States and 
crosses into Canada, the Canadian border authorities transmit this data electronically to 
DHS. As a result, an “entry” into Canada serves as the “exit” from the United States and 
the departure is automatically recorded.251 This process happens with existing biographic 
systems, without the need for biometrics.  
However, reliance on biographic exit data has potential drawbacks that could have 
implications for homeland security efforts. One weakness in biographical systems is the 
possibility of data errors or fraud affecting enforcement operations. Biographical systems 
rely on traditional terminologies, such as name, date of birth, identification number, or 
passport number ascribed to an individual by a government entity. Because biographical 
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exit systems rely on this type of data, an imposter could leave the United States in someone 
else’s place to avoid visa overstay regulations.  
Even with improvements in spelling software, incorrect or misspelled names 
continue to pose a challenge to border enforcement agencies. Name errors on biographic 
passenger manifests could result in false departure data, or missed opportunities to identify 
possible terrorists or criminals. This can be seen by the fact that the nineteen hijackers on 
9/11 had over 300 spelling variations of their names.252 Whether by pure mistake, cultural 
translation, or nefarious intent, the anomalies in misspelled names continue to vex software 
designed to identify and correct these issues.253 For example, when Tamerlan Tsarnaev 
traveled to Russia in 2012, he was not sufficiently identified on terror watchlists because 
his biographic data did not translate from Cyrillic precisely as entered in the database.254 
As a result, the FBI was unaware of a potentially crucial piece of intelligence.255  
President Obama emphasized international tourism to the United States during his 
administration, with the goal of 100 million visitors coming annually by 2021.256 If this is 
ever attained, just maintaining the current overstay rate of 1.17 percent means the natural 
effect of the status quo would result in over one million foreign nationals overstaying their 
visas every year. A lack of enforcement efforts against these cases would result in a 
continued aggregate increase in the number of visa violators remaining inside the United 
States.   
A prior lack of enforcement priority for visa overstay violators has also affected 
efforts to apprehend and remove these cases. In many instances, nonimmigrant visitors in 
the United States who overstay their visas are afforded a hearing before an immigration 
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judge. Depending on their length of overstay, flight risk, criminal history, and other factors, 
ICE may hold the visitor in custody pending this hearing. However, ICE could release the 
visitor with instructions to report to a trial in the future, which could be several years 
away.257 As a result, with the low prioritization of visa overstay cases, an unintended 
consequence of apprehending a violator could be that the person is allowed to remain 
longer inside the United States—the exact outcome the person sought by overstaying the 
visa. Making visa overstays a priority for apprehension, custody, and detention until 
removal would have an impact on this consequence, as violators would not be able to 
remain free while their cases are heard; their immigration violation would not be rewarded 
by being released. 
Maintaining current exit verification processes and enforcement levels will have 
little impact on reducing visa overstay violations. Even at present overstay rates, the 
number of visa violators is likely to increase each year due to the growing number of 
visitors to the United States. A status quo policy would utilize existing systems and 
methods to identify overstay violators, and would not generate additional costs for added 
enforcement or a biometric exit system. However, sustaining existing enforcement levels 
against visa violators will not decrease the number of overstay cases still present, nor will 
it deter future violators.  
B. POLICY OPTION B—BIOMETRIC EXIT SYSTEM WITH CURRENT 
ENFORCEMENT 
Completing the installation of a biometric exit system at all U.S. departure points 
and maintaining current enforcement efforts is another policy option to address visa 
overstay cases. Past DHS pilot programs established the ability to biometrically record the 
exit of foreign visitors without complications.258 Fully implementing a biometric exit 
system would satisfy congressional mandates, improve HSI’s database review for overstay 
violators, and allow ICE to more rapidly identify visitors who have violated the period of 
admission for their visas. Under this policy, CBP would work with commercial carriers to 
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collect biometric data from passengers simultaneous to the boarding process. Airlines 
would then transmit this data to CBP and OBIM for automatic exit verification review 
using biometric data.  
This option would require the installation of biometric collection technology at all 
departure points in the United States. The installation or redesign of infrastructure to 
accommodate departure inspections that do not currently exist would be needed. Additional 
staff would be required to facilitate the flow of people and goods departing the United 
States; officer training on new biometric technological systems would also be needed. 
However, additional interior enforcement staffing and detention support would not be 
needed, as existing enforcement procedures and staffing levels are maintained under this 
option.  
In 2008, US-VISIT conducted a study that compared biographic-only exit systems 
to a system using biometrics. The goal of this analysis was to enable DHS to track more 
reliably the departure of foreign nationals using biometrics.259 This analysis also identified 
several desired outcomes from using a biometric exit system. For example, using a 
biometric exit system would automatically record a departure on the subject’s entry/exit 
record; the system will make it easier to identify a person who has overstayed his or her 
visa for possible enforcement action.260 Finally, the study indicated a biometric system 
would provide complete immigration records for travelers, allowing agencies to allocate 
resources and expedite entry of compliant travelers.  
Incomplete immigration records based on biographic data can be problematic for 
overstay enforcement. Poor biographic exit data could inadvertently identify a foreign 
traveler as an overstay, causing them problems for future travel. If a carrier improperly 
transmits biographical data to DHS, the records may not be appropriately matched.261 A 
biometric system would eliminate these issues with automatic matching and case closure 
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upon departure. Biometric exit systems are also advantageous when analyzing passenger 
data to identify overstays. DHS officials have reported to Congress that significant staffing 
considerations are required to research multiple possible visa overstay cases.262 In the 
same testimony, ICE also stated that implementing a biometric exit system would improve 
data quality, efficiency, and effectiveness in its efforts to identify and remove overstay 
violators.  
Additionally, biometric exit systems could provide a better method to identify 
fugitive aliens that have departed the United States. The current process to identify self-
deporting fugitive aliens requires manual review of airline manifests. Inaccurate names or 
aliases could once again pose an issue. If an alien using a false name later becomes an 
immigration fugitive and self-deports using his or her real name and passport, a biographic 
manifest will not identify that subject. However, if ICE captured the subject’s fingerprints, 
a biometric exit system could alert ICE to close the case because the person has departed. 
This automation could save resources, as it would prevent ICE from searching for people 
who are no longer in the United States.  
Visa overstay data is a critical factor in determining which countries may remain in 
the VWP based on the compliance rates of travelers from each nation.263 Statutes also 
require that DHS submit an annual report detailing the amount of visa overstay cases for 
that year.264 The law has required this submission since 1998. However, DHS and legacy 
agencies did not submit a visa overstay report until 2015. One primary reason for this delay 
in submission has been DHS’s lack of confidence surrounding the accuracy of its overstay 
data.265 This data is crucial if Congress and agency leaders are going to make decisions 
about resource allocation, budgeting, and risk assessment related to the issuance of visas. 
Rapid access to data and the ability to verify violators automatically using biometrics will 
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enable managers and agencies to make informed decisions based on overstay rates. The 
implementation and use of a biometric exit system would provide this data.  
When legislation first mandated a biometric exit system, installation and 
infrastructure costs were a legitimate concern.266 In the years following the IIRIRA bill, 
biometric technology was expensive, with initial system costs estimated between 
$3–6 billion.267 However, more extensive use of biometric technology by federal and other 
agencies has driven prices down. Biometric technology proponents indicate that prior 
estimates are no longer accurate, and installation of an affordable exit system with little 
disruption to trade or travel is possible.268  
Despite the advantages of biometrics, prior overstay enforcement efforts and 
removal data indicate that routine overstay cases are not a priority. If the flaw of not 
prioritizing overstay cases for enforcement action is built into the deployment of a 
biometric exit system, the outcome may not be any different from the status quo. The use 
of biometric exit technology will merely allow the CTCEU or OAU to more easily identify 
overstay violators and provide targeting intelligence to enforcement agencies. Technology 
will have no real effect if violators are not physically located and removed according to 
existing law.  
Another challenge to a nationwide exit system may have nothing to do with 
technology. DHS has already shown that current biometric technology can efficiently 
identify foreign nationals upon entry into the United States. The crux of the implementation 
issue is the plan to use it for exit verification. Current U.S. regulations require airports and 
commercial carriers to provide processing areas for international arrival inspections; there 
has never been a similar mandate for departure inspections.269 Airport layout and design 
has environmental effects on the ability to process exiting passengers based on the physical 
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placement of the technology.270 DHS officials have recommended that biometric exit 
equipment be as close to the departure gate as possible to avoid identifying someone as 
“exiting” who then does not depart.271 In addition, land border exit verification presents a 
significant challenge for DHS border agencies. The nature of land border crossing 
precludes CBP’s ability to stop every car to scan outgoing passengers for non-citizens 
without dramatically impeding traffic or the flow of trade.  
Modern airports, seaports, and land border crossings do not have the required space, 
physical infrastructure, or staffing to support exit processing operations. In 2016, CBP 
estimated it would cost approximately $790 million per year for staffing to process 
biometrics of 95 percent of departing air passengers (not including infrastructure costs).272 
To address this cost, Congress has authorized the collection of $1 billion total in new visa 
fees to offset some of the development and implementation costs of the biometric exit 
system.273  
DHS policymakers and border agency managers must be cognizant that not every 
exit system is perfect in every environment. A one-size-fits-all biometric exit approach is 
problematic given the variety of border departure environments in our nation.274 There 
may not be a “best biometric capture system,” only the most suitable one for a particular 
situation or environment, which is especially relevant when considering a biometric exit 
system.275 Weather, topography, existing infrastructure, and the type of exit point will all 
have impacts on the use and implementation of a biometric exit control system. DHS has 
been moving toward a multi-modal approach to capturing biometric data. This approach 
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would allow entry and exit data to be obtained efficiently regardless of the place of 
departure or other environmental factors.276  
The DHS “Fiscal Year 2017 Entry/Exit Overstay Report” documented that the 
amount of foreign visitors overstaying their visas decreased by 0.14 percent between 2016 
and 2017.277 However, in the same report, DHS admitted that no specific cause could be 
directly attributed to this decrease. The report cites possible contributing factors as 
“improvements in immigration enforcement, and border security operations, and country-
specific changes to political, infrastructure, or humanitarian conditions.”278 The report 
does not define “border security operations,” nor does it explicitly mention the continuing 
installation of biometric exit technology as a possible factor for the overstay decline. It says 
explicitly that increased enforcement is a contributing factor to the overstay decline rate, 
indicating that biometric technology had no measurable effect on the recent reduction, or 
at least no more so than increased enforcement or maintaining the status quo.   
An additional exit implementation issue is the need for more than just the 
technology. In a 2016 report to Congress, CBP advised “merely placing biometric devices” 
in a port environment without the requisite support “is unlikely to advance an overall 
biometric arrival/departure system.”279 While the installation of a biometric exit system 
would satisfy congressional mandates, any such system must have the funding, support, 
staffing, and commitment of U.S. border enforcement agencies and transportation partners 
to make it work. The advent of a biometric exit system would enhance DHS’s ability to 
quickly identify overstay violators and generate target intelligence, but it would do nothing 
to help locate or apprehend overstay violators. The ability to quickly identify overstay cases 
using biometrics is superfluous if enforcement actions are not taken to remove current 
violators or deter future ones. 
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C. POLICY OPTION C—BIOMETRICS COMBINED WITH INCREASED 
ENFORCEMENT   
A combination policy for combatting visa overstay violations would join an 
automated biometric exit system with increased enforcement levels against overstay 
violators. This approach would see the installation of a biometric exit system at U.S. points 
of departure. CBP and ICE would utilize the biometric data gathered during the exit process 
to identify, apprehend, and remove overstay violators who remain in the U.S. interior.  
The implementation of this policy would require the technology and infrastructure 
updates of Option B as well as an increase in staffing, or at least reassignment of resources, 
dedicated to overstay violator location and apprehension. Another consequence of this 
choice is the need for additional detention space and removal assets to address the increase 
in detained immigration violators. Overstay violators would need to be held pending an 
immigration hearing; commercial or charter aviation assets would be required to repatriate 
those violators ordered to be removed from the United States.  
A biometric exit system alone will not necessarily have an impact on overstay levels 
without proactive enforcement actions conducted by DHS agencies. Even if a fully 
implemented biometric exit system instantly notifies DHS of an overstay violation, the 
number of violators in the country will not diminish if they are not apprehended and 
removed. A correlating increase in enforcement efforts against overstay cases will reduce 
the number of violators currently present and would serve as a deterrent to potential 
violators. 
This policy would combine the advantages of the biometric exit system described 
above with the removal efforts and deterrent effect from increased visa overstay 
enforcement. Such an enforcement increase would allow the removal of current overstay 
violators as well as deter potential future violators from remaining here past their admission 
period. Recent executive orders from the Trump administration regarding interior 
immigration enforcement indicate that increased enforcement leads to an increase in arrests 
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and has a resulting deterrence effect.280 Visa overstay and immigration enforcement efforts 
in other nations also support this argument.  
The EU’s Smart Borders program has many similarities with the United States’ 
goal of a biometric entry/exit system, though the systems differ. EU member states seem 
more accustomed to conducting routine immigration status queries of foreign visitors 
within their internal borders. Member states also seem more likely to capture fingerprints 
of suspected criminals or immigration cases, which would alert enforcement agencies to 
possible violators. As a result, the EU appears more likely to identify and apprehend visa 
violators if all member state enforcement agencies utilize linked databases.  
As in the United States, a foreign visitor might enter the EU and decide not to leave 
when his or her admission period is over. Even with an alert from a biometric exit system, 
law enforcement officials would still need to track down and apprehend violators to bring 
them to justice. The European Parliament has recognized that law enforcement action is 
still necessary even with the EES system. EU academics have also pointed out a 
technology-based method for catching visa overstay cases is not viable because it only 
identifies violators as they cross the border to exit the EU. A biometric EES at airports or 
land borders will not detect or deter subjects who wish to remain in the EU after overstaying 
their visa if they are not trying to depart.281  
Strict immigration enforcement regulations like the U.K.’s may have an impact on 
illegal immigration in general, and visa overstays in particular, if implemented in the 
United States. Making sure that visitors depart the United States to adjust their status, as 
the U.K. does, could increase overstay enforcement and border security by making sure 
foreign nationals actually leave the country and go through background and security checks 
again. The U.K. practice of removing aliens before completing their appeal could also 
speed up the removal process and possibly act as a deterrent for visa violators.  
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Requiring police agencies to share victim and witness information with U.S. 
immigration agencies would provide an additional source of information to identify and 
locate visa overstay violators. However, as more local police agencies and communities in 
the United States refuse to cooperate with DHS and ICE (so-called “sanctuary cities”), they 
have declined to share data regarding criminals. Therefore, the notion of them doing so for 
victims and witnesses seems unlikely. Agencies in these communities would also be less 
likely to conduct immigration status checks on individuals they encounter, whereas in the 
U.K. such queries are obligatory.  
To date, the U.K.’s immigration enforcement efforts appear focused more on law 
enforcement and compliance than technology. The U.K. Parliament has passed strong 
immigration laws that make it difficult for illegal immigrants or visa overstay violators to 
acclimate in the U.K. While the U.K. has begun implementing some biometric exit control 
features at some airports, the implementation of strong immigration laws appears to be the 
cornerstone of U.K. immigration policy. Given the current U.S. political situation 
surrounding the immigration issue, however, it is unlikely that Congress would pass a bill 
containing strict enforcement provisions like those found in the U.K.’s 2014 immigration 
law.  
Locating visa overstay cases in the United States is one of the primary challenges 
of effective overstay enforcement. As discussed previously, a biometric exit system will 
not provide the location of an overstay violator; it will only alert authorities to the violator’s 
illegal presence in the country. Under U.K. immigration law, employers, banks, and 
landlords query U.K. databases about the immigration status of new customers and 
applicants. Doing this in the United States would allow DHS to identify and locate visa 
overstay cases for apprehension based on information from these data queries.  
Another way to possibly locate overstay violators could be a program such as 
Australia’s Community Status Resolution Service (CSRS). This program provides aid to 
visitors in Australia who may violate their visas. It allows subjects to seek assistance 
regarding their status and offers an alternative to detention if they are working with the 
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service to adjust their illegal visa status.282 A comparable plan enacted by USCIS could 
help identify current visa overstay cases, update their location, and monitor them while 
they address their immigration status. DHS already has alternatives to detention programs 
in place that could supervise these cases. However, instituting a program whereby 
immigration violators get “another chance” may be detrimental to enforcement efforts; it 
might send the message that overstaying your visa is okay. A program such as CSRS may 
be most productive only in limited cases to ensure that overstay enforcement efforts remain 
an essential priority for U.S. homeland security.  
India’s Aadhaar program presents another possible enforcement opportunity for 
U.S. border enforcement agencies. Recalcitrant nations can sometimes make it difficult for 
DHS to repatriate their citizens by refusing to issue travel documents.283 While more 
countries have begun cooperating with removals under the current administration, it is still 
sometimes difficult to secure a travel document for removal because nations may argue 
someone is not a citizen of their country (even those who previously entered the United 
States with a passport but overstayed their visa). 
The Department of State already collects photographs and fingerprints of visa 
applicants who desire to come to the United States. Adding biometric collection like 
Aadhaar (full fingerprints, iris scans, and photographs) into a subject’s visa application and 
maintaining that data could allow DHS to positively verify that the person in question came 
from that nation. If people “lose” their passports, they would no longer be able to deny 
their identity because their fingerprints and iris scans would not change, even if they were 
apprehended years later. Ideally, these biometric identifiers would act as a self-passport so 
that a travel document is not even needed. If implemented, DHS could likely speed up 
removals of visa overstay cases and deter future overstays because foreign nationals could 
no longer hide their identity to circumvent deportation.  
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As in the U.K., U.S. enforcement agencies conduct worksite employment 
enforcement operations to ensure employers are complying with immigration law. The 
Trump administration has recently increased worksite enforcement operations to 
investigate criminal activity and apprehend immigration violators while instilling a culture 
of compliance among employers.284 In fiscal year 2017, HSI conducted 1,716 worksite 
inspections and made 139 criminal and 172 administrative arrests. Through July 20, 2018, 
HSI had conducted 6,093 worksite investigations and made 675 criminal and 984 
administrative arrests.285 This shows a significant increase in U.S. worksite enforcement 
operations. While visa overstay cases may not be specific targets, these efforts send a 
message that immigration enforcement is essential. These enforcement efforts could act as 
a deterrent for visa overstays if they cannot find illicit employment or believe they may be 
apprehended during a worksite enforcement operation.  
Despite the recent decrease in the percentage of overstay cases, certain visa types 
continue to have higher overstay rates than others, including certain student visas.286 As a 
result, the Trump administration has taken action to increase the penalties for these types 
of visa violators.287 These particular visas are good for the duration that someone is in the 
proper status inside the United States; they do not have a specific departure date. As such, 
a biometric exit system would be of no use to identify these violators because they have no 
admission period; they would not be present at a border crossing for a biometric system to 
annotate a late departure. This particular policy shift addresses enforcement explicitly 
against visa violators and impacts the ability of these violators to enter or adjust their status 
in the United States in the future. Such a change in policy illustrates the outcome of an 
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enhanced immigration enforcement policy, particularly one where a biometric system 
would have had little impact. 
Policy Option C provides DHS with the most significant opportunity to combat visa 
overstays effectively. It would combine the technological benefits of biometrically 
identifying visa violators with the enforcement resources needed to apprehend and remove 
them. The advantages of a biometric exit system would enhance DHS’s ability to rapidly 
identify overstay violators in an accurate manner. It would also provide decision-makers 
with data needed to make critical decisions regarding visas, enforcement, and also the VWP 
program. Recent increases in interior immigration enforcement have demonstrated that 
such efforts can remove immigration violators and possibly deter others from abusing the 
U.S. immigration system. The installation of an exit system nationwide will generate 
infrastructure and technology costs. Likewise, additional enforcement staffing to 
apprehend, detain, and remove violators will also require funding. However, the United 
States should continue the development and implementation of a biometric exit system 
while increasing interior enforcement efforts against visa overstay violators in an effort to 
close this vulnerability in defense of our nation.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A concerted enforcement effort to locate and remove visa overstay cases will not 
only reduce the number of immigration violators present in the United States but will also 
serve as a deterrent to future violators. These enforcement efforts can be performed in 
conjunction with information rapidly gleaned from a biometric system and analyzed by the 
CTCEU and OAU. ERO and HSI can then act on this data to apprehend visa overstay 
violators who remain within the United States. In addition, DHS and other immigration 
enforcement agencies should review other possible measures to ensure the enforcement of 
U.S. visa laws.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Visa Overstay Threat Analysis 
The current threat analysis surrounding visa overstays has come primarily from 
congressional testimony, GAO reports, and partisan think tank reviews. A study by the 
CATO Institute in 2016 indicated that the chance of being killed by a foreign-born terrorist 
who is in the United States on a tourist visa is 0.00003 percent.288 However, this study did 
not break down the threat on valid visitors versus visa overstay cases. A comprehensive 
risk analysis of the overstay threat conducted by the U.S. intelligence community has not 
been found to date; the intelligence community should conduct such an analysis. Such data 
would assist DHS in further identifying the threat posed by visa overstays from counter-
terrorism, criminal, and economic perspectives. This intelligence assessment would 
provide value to DHS and its respective agencies for a cost-benefit analysis of immigration 
enforcement efforts vis-à-vis overstay violators and the expenditures associated with 
apprehending them, as well as the cost of their presence in the United States.  
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2. Locating Overstay Violators Using Technology and Other Methods 
As mentioned previously, locating overstay cases can be challenging for 
enforcement agencies. DHS should continuously review new or improved technologies for 
possible methods to identify, track, or find visa overstay cases. CBP has already begun 
using the internet to remind certain visitors when their period of admission is up. Utilizing 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips, which are often contained in passports, may 
be another technique to locate an overstay case. However, current RFID technology 
limitations mean violators would have to have their passport with them to be located, and 
they cannot be located from long distances.289 Other technological methods for location 
should be continually analyzed and reviewed for feasibility. However, there is the 
likelihood that some of these methods may have privacy implications, which could 
complicate their implementation. 
Besides students or temporary workers who may be here for several years, the need 
for most foreign visitors to open a bank account here seems minimal. Proof of U.S. 
citizenship is not required to start a bank account under current federal guidelines.290 
However, most foreign travelers visiting the United States on a visa are only admitted for 
up to a six-month period of admission and should not require a U.S. bank account. Current 
technology such as ATMs, credit cards, internet banking, and mobile phone banking mean 
that visitors should be able to access their home bank without having to open a U.S. 
account.  
Thus, banks could collect identification from foreign nationals opening accounts or 
conducting large transactions. This data could be shared automatically through DHS and 
OBIM databases to identify overstay violators for possible enforcement action. Some U.S. 
banks already have policies to collect this information, though they do not appear to be 
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directly sharing it with DHS.291 An executive order could order the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency to mandate collection and automatic sharing of this data with 
DHS; this data could be used to locate and apprehend visa overstay violators. These 
notifications may raise privacy issues, however, even if the banks or customers are not 
notified of any query results. 
3. Leveraging Federal Immigration Enforcement 
Leveraging the private sector or state and local agencies for immigration overstay 
information would also enhance DHS’s ability to identify and locate overstay cases. 
However, private companies and state or local agencies may not be inclined to provide a 
client or customer’s immigration status to DHS given today’s political climate. 
Nonetheless, the executive branch could generate policies to ensure that federal agencies 
identify or collect immigration status when dealing with foreign nationals. Federal 
agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, could obtain this information any time they 
interact with a foreign national and interface with DHS for database review. If database 
queries identify the subject as an overstay case, enforcement agencies could respond 
appropriately using this data. This alert could take place without either the inquiring agency 
or the subject knowing there is an immigration issue; the database alert could be addressed 
solely by DHS. However, many federal agencies rely on the use of biographic data rather 
than biometric data, so an alias or a misspelled name presents the same challenges as a 
biographic departure system. 
4. Worksite Enforcement  
The Trump administration has recently increased worksite immigration 
enforcement to identify employees and employers who are violating U.S. immigration 
law.292 ICE should continue these efforts using its three-pronged approach of compliance, 
enforcement, and outreach.293 Increased worksite enforcement is one method to reduce a 
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potential draw for visitors to overstay their visas: illicit employment. Compliance and 
outreach functions will allow ICE to partner with employers and elicit voluntary 
compliance regarding the employment of authorized immigrants.  
DHS should also consider enhancing or increasing immigration reporting tools, 
such as E-Verify, to help employers identify illegal workers. The use of such systems 
would have an impact on visa overstays who are seeking illicit employment. E-Verify 
currently relies on biographical information, rather than biometrics, to identify possible 
violators. This can cause violators to not be properly identified in the system.294 DHS 
should enhance E-Verify to include a biometric capability and direct notifications to ICE 
when an overstay case is queried in the system. The system would then provide the violator 
and employer information to ICE for response and possible enforcement action. This 
process could be done automatically without letting the employer or subject even know 
there is a possible immigration violation. 
5. Changes in Adjustment of Status Law 
Section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act allows inspected and 
admitted foreign visitors to potentially adjust their status to a U.S. Lawful Permanent 
Resident. While there are several conditions and eligibility factors related to this change, 
overstaying a visa is not an immediate disqualifier for adjustment of status. This presents 
a potential incentive for visitors to violate their period of admission. Immigration 
enforcement proponents suggest that denying residency to visa violators will have an 
impact on overstay violations.295 Changing the law to eliminate adjustment in these cases 
may deter visitors from breaking the law, knowing they would not be able to adjust their 
status in the United States in the future. This deterrent would cause visitors to return home 
and reapply to visit or change their status in the United States.  
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6. Beyond the Mexican Border 
The cooperative relationship between Canada and the United States in the Beyond 
the Border program presents an important takeaway for U.S. border management. This 
collaborative enterprise is a critical component of visa overstay enforcement for the United 
States and Canada. However, visitors who depart via the Mexican border may not have 
their departure information captured; they could be falsely considered visa overstays 
because such an agreement does not currently exist with Mexico. Capturing this data is 
difficult due to incompatible database systems, infrastructure issues at border crossings, 
possible corruption, and inconsistent data capture for every non-U.S. citizen entering 
Mexico.296  
If subjects who have legally departed the United States at any departure point can 
be identified, vital resources will not be wasted searching for someone who left via the land 
border. Expanding the Beyond the Border initiative to the U.S.–Mexico border will have a 
positive impact on immigration enforcement, especially concerning visa overstay cases. 
Without a collaborative entry/exit border agreement with Mexico, foreign nationals could 
fly into the United States, depart over land via the southern border, and still appear on U.S. 
overstay lists as an in-country overstay. This lack of information impacts the ability of 
DHS border agencies to conduct overstay analysis and accurately identify visa violators.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Identifying, locating, apprehending, and removing visa overstay violators is 
critically important to the U.S. homeland security enterprise. Enforcing immigration laws, 
including visa overstay laws, can impact terrorism, crime, gangs, and drug trafficking in 
the United States. This enforcement can also positively affect the other social and economic 
impacts that a large illegal alien population has on society. Terrorists have shown the 
willingness and ability to exploit flaws or gaps in our security; the high number of 
nonimmigrant visitor overstays every year represents such a gap. 
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Enforcement and removal efforts against visa overstay cases have been historically 
low, despite the continued increase in the number of overstay violators. This gap indicates 
that enforcement against many overstay cases is not a priority. As a result, there is little to 
dissuade potential visa violators, who may realize that their likelihood of apprehension and 
removal is low despite remaining in the United States in violation of the law. Based on 
current immigration laws and policies, even if overstay violators are apprehended, they still 
may have the opportunity to stay in the United States while they fight their cases.  
The implementation of a biometric exit system alone will not address the problem 
of visa overstay violations. The threat of being identified by a technological system as a 
visa overstay rings hollow if there is no risk of repercussion for such a violation. Even with 
the advantages of a biometric system, enforcement agents will still be needed to locate, 
apprehend, and remove violators. Congressional testimony and government accounts echo 
this finding, including a recent DHS report that acknowledges increased enforcement as a 
possible factor for the overstay rate decline in 2017. DHS officials have also commented 
that immigration enforcement is good for national security and that a biometric system’s 
viability is reduced if action is not taken to apprehend violators identified by that system.  
The actions and comments of other nations, including the EU and U.K., also 
indicate that immigration enforcement is critical to address visa overstays and immigration 
law. Australian legislators have commented that the number of foreign nationals who have 
overstayed Australian visas for over 20 years “makes a mockery” of Australian border 
protection and overstay enforcement efforts.297 Even with the addition of biometric exit 
systems, other nations recognize the need for enforcement efforts in conjunction with 
technology to administer immigration laws. 
Maintaining the status quo for visa overstay enforcement in the United States by 
relying on biographic exit systems, minor biometric system implementation via “surges” 
at specific airports, and poor interior overstay enforcement would likely leave the United 
States with the same visa overstay security gap. Additional capital expenditure would not 
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be required but, barring changes in some other variable, the rate of overstay cases will 
likely not decrease. Even if the percentage of annual overstays violators remains the same, 
the number of violators may increase as international passenger traffic increases.  
Full implementation of a U.S. biometric exit system could be costly in light of 
training, increased enforcement staffing, infrastructure costs, and expenditures for 
biometric technology at all ports of entry. However, such a system would help DHS 
enforcement agencies quickly identify overstay cases and alleviate some of the current 
issues found with biographical exit systems. Nevertheless, a biometric exit system alone 
will not determine where a violator is or help authorities locate the violator; it will only 
notify DHS, which can be done now using biographic means. Also, implementing such a 
system without a commensurate increase in enforcement efforts may not have the desired 
impact on the overstay gap; violators will not be identified, apprehended, and removed. 
This may fail to deter future overstay violators. As such, a combination policy of biometrics 
and increased enforcement will have the most significant impact on combating visa 
overstay cases. This policy will ensure that foreign visitors depart as required by law, 
identify cases for apprehension, and deter future violators from overstaying their visas.  
Even with increased enforcement operations, policy changes, and the 
implementation of a biometric exit system, reducing visa overstay violations requires 
resources and support from all levels of DHS and the executive branch. DHS border 
enforcement agencies must send a message that the integrity of our immigration system is 
paramount and that U.S. immigration laws will be enforced. A commitment to 
enforcement, in combination with technology, will demonstrate that visa overstay cases are 
important and need to be addressed as a matter of U.S. immigration law and as part of the 
homeland security enterprise.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Legal Changes for Visa Overstay Violations 
One area for future research is related to criminalizing the offense of overstaying a 
visa. Currently only crossing the border without inspection is a criminal offense. Other 
federal immigration violations, including overstays, are handled administratively. There 
84 
have been recent efforts in Congress to add visa overstay violations to federal criminal 
statutes as well. One proposed bill would make the first overstay offense a criminal 
misdemeanor and subsequent offenses a felony.298 This change would have an impact on 
locating and apprehending violators from a criminal, rather than administrative, 
perspective. The threat of jail time and a criminal conviction would deter potential violators 
from overstaying their visas—but, again, only if such a criminal statute is enforced by 
DHS.299 An examination of these possible impacts could result in beneficial policy 
recommendations. 
2. Local and State Law Enforcement and Immigration  
The overall role of state and local law enforcement in federal immigration 
enforcement may also warrant further research. The limited number of ICE agents and 
deportation officers means that local and state law enforcement officers are more likely to 
encounter a visa overstay case during routine police work. This thesis does not address the 
current policies of these interactions, or how possible procedural improvements could be 
made to leverage local law enforcement assets to assist DHS and ICE in dealing with visa 
overstay cases. Further research or analysis could address such enhancements, examine the 
impact of sanctuary cities and political issues on immigration enforcement, and identify 
possible legislative solutions for cooperation and collaboration between DHS and law 
enforcement on immigration enforcement.  
                                                 
298 “Barletta Bill Makes Overstaying Visa Criminal Offense,” Congressman Lou Barletta, January 27, 
2017, https://barletta.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/barletta-bill-makes-overstaying-visa-criminal-
offense-0. 
299 “Fox Contributor and Former Acting Director of ICE Calls for Criminalizing Visa Overstays,” 
Media Matters for America, August 28, 2018, https://www.mediamatters.org/video/2018/08/28/fox-
contributor-and-former-acting-director-ice-calls-criminalizing-visa-overstays/221127. 
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